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I. INTRODUCTION 
Several generations ago a great economist began a book with the wry 
observation that science says the bumblebee can’t fly (it is “a successful 
but an insecure insect”).1  American capitalism, John Kenneth Galbraith 
went on to say, resembles the bumblebee—it can’t fly either, but 
somehow it does.2  The same may be said of multidistrict litigation 
(MDL) when it leads to aggregate settlement of product liability claims, 
especially those involving allegedly faulty drugs, which (along with 
claims arising from sales and service practices) make up more than a 
third of the thousands of federal cases gathered “for pretrial purposes” in 
various federal “transferee” courts.3 
The practice of MDL settlements of product liability cases has been 
subjected to devastating criticism on multiple grounds, and yet it keeps 
on flying.  MDL in these settings can actually be called “illegal.”  As 
critics have persuasively argued, this use of MDL is not authorized by 
law, does not fit within the purposes of the statute on which it rests, it is 
purposefully employed to avoid the safeguards that federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, erected to protect the rights of claimants.  
Equally concerning, MDL settlements of product liability cases are 
unfair to many claimants and the lawyers that represent them, lead the 
lawyers driving these things into questionable (if not unethical) behavior, 
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 1.   JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER 1 (1956) (likening “the American economy” to the Bumblebee). 
 2.   See id. 
 3.   See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIST. LITIG., Distribution of Pending MDLs by Type, 
in U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS (2015), 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2015.pdf. 
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lead courts to perform functions they are ill suited for, may well violate 
standards of due process, and have only the most tenuous claim to 
democratic legitimacy. 
So why do MDL mass tort settlements survive?  Examining this 
question seems worthwhile because this bumblebee is going to keep on 
flying.  Unlike the actual bumblebee, however, which confers benefits 
social and ecological and brings little risk to humanity, MDL mass tort 
settlements pose huge risks that are going unchecked.  We now know 
why the real bumblebee can fly: Its wings are too small, but it can fly 
because they “clap together” just before the bumblebee lifts off, creating 
enough vacuum to get it aloft.  The wings are so flexible that they can do 
what science had thought impossible.  Apparently the wings of MDL 
mass tort settlements can “clap together” too, and it is worthwhile to see 
how they accomplish this feat. 
This article argues that we need a checking mechanism for the MDL 
mass tort settlement—a form of review that would bring to bear a real 
adversary process in a court that has not already invested its energies and 
prestige in the settlement itself.  In short, it should be possible to mount a 
collateral challenge to the MDL mass tort settlement, brought by any 
claimant in the gathered suits that resulted in the settlement.  A second 
court should be able to address the adequacy of the settlement and to 
resolve the question whether the original lawyers adequately represented 
sidelined claimants whose interests were entrusted to a plaintiffs’ 
management committee by the judge in the transferee forum.  Class 
action settlements require fairness examinations by the rendering court, 
and there is strong disagreement in the literature on the question (and 
appropriate scope) of collateral challenge to such settlements.  There is 
currently no mechanism for collateral challenge to MDL settlements, 
which is—at one and the same time—one of the reasons why they have 
become popular and one of the reasons why they are so much at odds 
with our basic ideas about procedure and fairness. 
II. THE RISE OF MDL AGGREGATIVE SETTLEMENTS 
Enacted in 1968 to deal with a flood of lawsuits alleging conspiracy 
in the electrical equipment industry (some 1,800 suits had been filed 
across the country), the Multi-District Litigation Statute created a panel 
of federal judges empowered to transfer pending federal cases to a single 
judge for purposes of pretrial discovery.4  The statute has a low threshold 
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of commonality, allowing transfer of cases involving “one or more 
common questions of fact.”5  It authorizes transfer of cases solely for 
pretrial purposes, providing that each transferred action “shall be 
remanded” to the court of original filing “at or before” the conclusion of 
pretrial proceedings.6  The Supreme Court held years ago that the 
gathered cases cannot go forward to trial in the transferee forum,7 and 
indeed the electrical equipment cases were not tried or settled in the 
transferee forum either, but continued to be resolved in the courts in 
which they were initially filed.8  Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that 
almost none of the cases gathered in a single forum under the MDL 
procedures ever returns to the original court: Almost all settle in the 
transferee forum or are finally resolved in other ways.9 
While it was once the case that only a few judges presided in 
transferee fora in MDL cases, and they were a tiny fraction of the civil 
docket, now they make up a significant part of the federal civil docket 
and occupy the time of many trial judges.10  Literally thousands of suits 
have been gathered under MDL procedures, including many mass tort 
cases, particularly in the areas of drug litigation where the Vioxx and 
Zyprexa cases are modern paradigms.  In the Vioxx cases, the claim was 
that a painkiller increased substantially the risk of heart attack and 
stroke.11  In the Zyprexa cases, the claim was that a drug approved for the 
                                                          
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2205–06 (2008); Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, 
An Uncommon Focus on “Common Questions”: Two Problems with the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation’s Treatment of the “One or More Common Questions of Fact” Requirement 
for Centralization, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2297, 2300–01 (2008) (citing Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, 
The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 622 
(1964)). 
 5.   28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 6.   Id. 
 7.   Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40–41 (1998). 
 8.   See Herrmann & Bownas, supra note 4, at 2300–02.   
 9.   Statistics show that the JPML has transferred 462,501 cases for pretrial, of which 13,432 
were remanded (2.9%), 398 were “reassigned” for trial in transferee districts (less than .1%), and 
359,548 were “terminated in the transferee courts” (77.7%).  See Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/judicial-panel-
multidistrict-litigation.aspx [http://perma.cc/MPX2-ETC8]. 
 10.   See Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict 
Litigation, 64 EMORY L.J. 329, 331 (2014) [hereinafter Dodge, Facilitative Judging] (reporting that 
one third of federal cases are MDL matters) (citing DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, 
STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR LARGE AND MASS-TORT MDLS, at x (2014), 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/standards_and_best_practices_for_larg
e_and_mass-tort_mdls.pdf).   
 11.   For accounts of the Vioxx litigation, see Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private 
Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 142–46 (2012); Howard M. Erichson & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 274–79 (2011) 
[hereinafter Erichson & Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure]. 
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treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder had unwanted side 
effects that weren’t adequately disclosed, “includ[ing] weight gain, 
hyperglycemia, and diabetes.”12  The Volkswagen recall litigation, 
arising in late 2015 after news surfaced that the German car maker had 
rigged some half million diesel cars to fool emissions tests,13  quickly led 
to consolidation in the Northern District of California before Judge 
Breyer (brother of Justice Steven Breyer).14 
It is worth noting that these mass tort settlements, accomplished by 
MDL procedures, are not only numerous but gigantic in terms of the 
aggregate amount of liability.  When Judge Weinstein presided over the 
Agent Orange settlement of $180 million in 1984, it was the largest 
settlement to date, delivering some form of recovery to 240,000 
claimants (an average of $720/person, although there were many who got 
more than that and many who got nothing).15  The 2005 Vioxx settlement 
of $4.85 billion was, in inflation-adjusted terms, almost twelve times 
higher than Agent Orange, although the number of claimants was much 
smaller (48,000) and average recovery is much higher (more than 
$100,000/person).16  The settlements in the Zyprexa case ($700 million) 
was also exponentially higher than Agent Orange.17  So these cases are 
big business, not small potatoes, and the use of MDL procedures has 
risen sharply in mass tort cases.18 
A. What Is So Attractive About This Gathering Mechanism? 
The attractions of nonclass product liability settlements are 
numerous: In a nutshell, judges want them and have the leverage to push 
parties into serious settlement talks.  Lawyers for plaintiffs want them—
                                                          
 12.   For an account of the Zyprexa litigation, see Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The 
Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 395–400 (2011) [hereinafter Mullenix, Dubious 
Doctrines]. 
 13.   Martha Neil, Dozens of VW Lawsuits Will Almost Surely Be Consolidated, but Where?, 
A.B.A. J. (Sept. 29, 2015, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/dozens_of_vw_lawsuits_will_almost_surely_be_consolidat
ed_but_where. 
 14.   See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 148 F. 
Supp. 3d 1367, 1370–71 (J.P.M.L. 2015). 
 15.   Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 801–02 (2010) 
(citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 16.   Id. at 802, 802 tbl.2. 
 17.   Id. at 801–02, 802 tbl.2. (citing In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 18.   See id. at 801 (the MDL process has “supplemented and perhaps displaced” class actions 
as a mechanism for large settlements).   
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at least those who are given the power to run the case—for reasons of 
agency cost that are magnified in high-stakes litigation (whether 
plaintiffs themselves want them is another question, as is the question 
whether the sidelined lawyers for plaintiffs want them).  Defendants 
want settlement too, being willing to sit down and bargain for the nearest 
thing they can get to a global resolution that enables them to “move 
beyond” carrying unknown (but potentially huge) liabilities on their 
books.  And not least, nonclass settlements are to a large extent creatures 
of contract and agency law that avoid the procedural restrictions of class 
actions and seem to be virtually unchallengeable and unreviewable. 
Why do judges want them?  Besides the docket pressures that make 
settlement preferable to trials in civil litigation across the board, there 
have always been judges for whom the MDL process is an invitation to 
push as far as possible toward concluding the cases gathered in this 
way.19  Indeed, there is something in the very dynamics of the MDL 
process that pushes toward settlement.20  Perhaps equally important, the 
familiarity that the transferee judge acquires in overseeing the pretrial 
process must give rise to a sense of ownership and a related sense that 
sending the cases back would put a burden on judges in the courts of 
original filing, who typically learn little about the cases before they are 
whisked away to the transferee forum.  In the Agent Orange litigation, 
for example, Judge Pratt as the first presiding judge certified a class and 
made innumerable rulings on the matter,21 but upon his elevation to the 
Court of Appeals in 1982 the suit was assigned to his colleague Judge 
Weinstein, who took over the case and immediately scheduled it for 
trial.22  After the Agent Orange settlement, when other Agent Orange 
cases were filed around the country, it was unthinkable that anyone other 
than Judge Weinstein should handle them, and the MDL panel 
                                                          
 19.   See, e.g., Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor 
Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575 (1978) (describing expansively the powers of 
transferee judges, stressing that they can transfer gathered cases under venue statutes and rule on 
dispositive motions). 
 20.   Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?  Toward a Maximalist 
Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2288–89 (2008) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Maximalist Use of MDL’s Transfer Power] (“[T]here is at least some reason for 
institutional uneasiness about more aggressive use of MDL procedures to maximize the judicial 
system’s ability to achieve the most comprehensive settlements.”). 
 21.   See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).   
 22.   See PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 
92–122 (1986).  See generally Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of 
the Class Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719 (2006) (short and readable description of the 
Agent Orange litigation). 
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transferred them to him as well.23 Once a judge becomes expert in a 
particular controversy, assuming that he has the kinds of skills essential 
in managing such things, it becomes overwhelmingly likely that similar 
cases will find their way into his court. 
Where do judges get the leverage?  It comes at the outset from their 
power to appoint a Plaintiffs’ Management Committee (PMC) or 
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (PSC) that is charged with running the 
litigation for all parties.  No statute confers this power, and the only Rule 
that authorizes judges to take this step is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP or Rule) 23(g), which of course applies only in class suits.  
Nevertheless the power to appoint the PMC exists as a matter of federal 
common law, traceable to a decision nearly 70 years ago in the 
MacAlister case, where the Second Circuit ordered consolidation of three 
shareholder derivative actions, both for pretrial discovery and for trial.24  
The Second Circuit opinion assured the trial judge that she had the power 
to appoint “general counsel” for the purpose of “channeling the efforts of 
counsel along constructive lines,” in order to “supervise and coordinate” 
the cases of the various plaintiffs.25  In MDL cases this power is taken for 
granted, and Judge Fallon in the Vioxx litigation issued an order directing 
plaintiffs to submit to him nominations for a PSC, from which he made 
the selections and appointments.26 
More importantly, appointment to the committees that “run things” 
for plaintiffs (and sometimes for defendants) concentrates in a small 
group great power over all the claims, and it is this small group that the 
transferee judge deals with as the case goes forward.  There are 
essentially no standards that govern the judge in making this selection, 
although it has been suggested that the process should be regulated after 
the manner that prevails in securities litigation.27  Two consequences 
ensue from this arrangement: The first is that the judge has extraordinary 
control over the attorneys running things on the plaintiffs’ side.  The 
second is that lawyers for plaintiffs who are not selected for the PMC 
find themselves on the outs with little to do, little power to affect the 
                                                          
 23.   See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).   
 24.   MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 25.   Id. at 67–68. 
 26.   In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2005 WL 850963, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 
2005).  See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.22 (2004) (courts in 
complex cases should “institute procedures under which one or more attorneys are selected and 
authorized to act on behalf of other counsel and their clients”).   
 27.   Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-
District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 166–70 (2010) (arguing for a 
system that would appoint lawyers with valuable client inventories on the PMCs in MDL cases).   
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course of the proceedings, and reduced expectation of compensation, 
even in the eventuality of a positive outcome.  They become bystanders 
in their own lawsuits.  A sidelined lawyer who tries to inject himself in 
the process, or who resists a settlement favored by the trial judge, would 
“incur the displeasure” of the judge by such actions.28 
Consider the degree of control in the hands of the transferee MDL 
judge: Of course she manages pretrial discovery (or assigns magistrates 
to do it), but she also exercises considerable control over attorney fees 
and over settlement.  An early attempt by Judge Lord in the intrauterine 
contraceptive device litigation to inject himself into an agreed settlement 
was rebuffed by the Eighth Circuit,29 but times have changed.  In the 
Zyprexa litigation, for example, Judge Weinstein invoked—really the 
better term is “invented”—the concept of the “quasi-class action” as the 
basis for directing special masters to adjust the fee schedules of all 
claimants in the transferred cases.30  Drawing on the same “quasi-class 
action” concept, Judge Fallon similarly set the fees in the Vioxx 
litigation, where the settlement agreement made an express provision for 
the court to “oversee various aspects” of administering the settlement, 
including determining the amount of “common benefit work.”31  The 
power of the transferee judge over fees to be paid to counsel as part of a 
settlement is itself an extraordinary lever that puts enormous power into 
the hands of the judge.32 
In the World Trade Center cases, Judge Hellerstein disapproved a 
proposed settlement because it provided too little compensation to some 
claimants, and later approved one that increased recovery for them.  The 
                                                          
 28.   Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 682 (2013).   
 29.   See Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1187–88 (8th Cir. 1984) (Judge Lord 
wrote “So Ordered” with signature on settlement agreement; reviewing court reverses; this 
“gratuitous notation” is “prejudicial” to defendant in implying that court “might exercise its powers, 
including its contempt power” to enforce settlement).   
 30.   See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490–92, 496–97 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (in this quasi-class action, “a federal court may exercise its supervisory power to ensure that 
fees are in conformance with codes of ethics and professional responsibility even when a party has 
not challenged the validity of the fee contract;” the court may also limited fees to 20% for certain 
claims with a maximum of $500 for costs, and capped other fees at 35%, with room for special 
master to make upward adjustment to 37.5% or downward to 30% in light of circumstances). 
 31.   In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609–10 (E.D. La. 2008) (describing 
two-step process including examination of “reasonableness of all the contingent fee contracts” and 
then “allocating a percentage” of fees for common benefit work).   
 32.   See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1991–92 (2011) [hereinafter Silver, Responsibilities of Lead 
Lawyers and Judges] (little authority addresses the practice of trial judges in setting fees in MDL 
cases; lawyers in Guidant and Vioxx cases acted opportunistically, using their control over settlement 
negotiations “to increase the amount of money available for common benefit fees and to prevent 
disabled lawyers from complaining”). 
538 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
parties had agreed on $575 million (assuming 95% participation among 
claimants, with $23.4 million for future claims), but Judge Hellerstein’s 
disapproval led to the addition of $125 million plus $55 million from an 
insurance fund, and led as well to a redesigned “settlement grid” setting 
forth the kinds of relief available for various claimants.33  In short, the 
idea that judges in MDL cases have settlement-approval authority similar 
to what they have in class action cases under Rule 23(e) seems well on 
its way to becoming institutionalized.34 
It is true that the World Trade Center litigation was not an MDL 
case—Congress created a fund to compensate 9/11 victims, famously 
administered by Kenneth Feinberg (litigation followed).35  The Vioxx 
litigation, however, was a real MDL mass tort settlement, and the main 
decision in that case asserts (at least assumes) that the court has power 
and discretion to examine a proposed settlement in the interest of 
assuring “fairness,” and to disapprove any settlement that is too high or 
too low or that, in the view of the judge, fails to treat claimants fairly as 
among themselves.36  The settlement approved in the Vioxx cases came 
after six bellwether trials went forward, one in Texas and five in 
Louisiana (while the forum in New Orleans was displaced by the effects 
of Hurricane Katrina).37  This settlement was, as Professor Sherman 
points out, apparently “crafted cooperatively by counsel in both federal 
                                                          
 33.   Alexandra N. Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and 
“Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 345–47 (2011) (citing 
Mireya Navarro, Deal Is Reached on Health Costs of 9/11 Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at 
A1).  See generally Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination: Lessons from 
the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 199 (2008). 
 34.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (class claims may be settled, dismissed or compromised “only 
with the court’s approval” after notice, opportunity for hearing, and on finding that it is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate”).   
 35.   See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 178–91 (Public Affairs 2005) 
[hereinafter FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?] (describing 9/11 Fund as “unique response to an 
unprecedented event,” but arguing that public compensation protecting against “unforeseen 
misfortune” is “an alien notion, inconsistent with liberty,” and that our traditions of limited 
government means that government “shouldn’t pay out millions in personal compensation for death 
or injury as an entitlement” and that doing so undercuts notions of “[i]ndividual responsibility”); 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT? 56–62 (Public Affairs 2012) [hereinafter FEINBERG, 
WHO GETS WHAT?] (describing author’s 33 months as special master and adhering to view that 9/11 
Fund was “sound public policy,” but also that it is “inconsistent with an American political 
philosophy characterized by equal protection” and “egalitarianism and fair play” to provide public 
compensation for a limited group, each receiving a different amount).   
 36.   See In re Vioxx, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 610, 613–14 (describing two-step process including 
examination of “reasonableness of all the contingent fee contracts” and then “allocating a 
percentage” of fees for common benefit work).   
 37.   Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2335–37 (2008) [hereinafter Fallon, Grabill & 
Wynne, Bellwether Trials] (describing these trials). 
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and state courts, and blessed and overseen in execution by the MDL 
court.”38  Not surprisingly, Judge Fallon had urged the parties to begin 
settlement negotiations,39 and he took the unusual step of including with 
him, on the bench in a status conference in which the settlement was 
presented, the judges presiding over Vioxx cases in state court that had 
not been gathered in federal court.40  It is clear from the remarks made at 
the time that the judges were pleased with the settlement.41 
Why do lawyers for plaintiffs want MDL aggregate mass tort 
settlements?  Obviously there is a financial incentive to serve on the 
PMC if, as usually happens, the judge makes upward adjustments in the 
fees recoverable for doing what gets called “common benefit” work in 
the likely event of a settlement.  Like the custom of appointing the PMC, 
we have what amounts to almost an ancient pedigree for the idea that a 
judge can tax a settlement to ensure that lawyers conducting discovery in 
gathered cases are paid for their extra work, and that inactive lawyers 
don’t recover “windfalls” for doing very little.  Almost forty years ago 
the Ninth Circuit in the Vincent case held that a judge can tax the 
settlement share of clients in consolidated litigation to pay the fees of 
those court-appointed lawyers who do the lion’s share of the pretrial 
work,42 and modern authority confirms the judge’s authority to tax a 
settlement that a defendant in a consolidated case makes with parallel 
claimants in nongathered cases (often pending in state court in distant 
fora) by ordering defendant to withhold from the settlements an amount 
corresponding to what the court thinks is the plaintiffs’ fair share of the 
common benefit work.43  Service on such a committee virtually assures 
significant recovery of attorney fees when the case settles. 
Appointment to the PMC is big business.44  Typically its work is 
                                                          
 38.   Sherman, supra note 4, at 2223.   
 39.   In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2010 WL 724084, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 
2010) (describing conference in which presiding Judge Fallon and state judges from Texas, New 
Jersey, and California “expressed the view that it was timely for the parties to begin serious 
settlement discussions”).   
 40.   Grabill, supra note 11, at 142–45. 
 41.   See id. at 145, 145 nn.102–03 (2012) (citing to the “Transcript of Status Conference,” 
which reflected the presence of Judges Fallon, Carol Higbee of New Jersey Superior Court and 
Victoria Chaney of California Superior Court in Los Angeles; in which Judge Fallon comments that 
“a large portion of the credit for resolving litigation belongs to the lawyer”).  
 42.   See Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 770–73 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 43.   See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 617 F. App’x 136, 141–44 
(3d Cir. 2015) (federal court in Eastern District of Pennsylvania could tax defendant in MDL case by 
ordering it to withhold 7% from California state court settlement in related litigation to pay common 
benefit fund).   
 44.   They go under a variety of names—PMCs (Plaintiffs’ Management Committees); PECs 
(Plaintiffs’ Executive Committees); PPCs (Plaintiffs’ Planning Committees).   
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extensive and must be financed, so appointment to a PMC doesn’t come 
cheap.  Reportedly judges appoint such committees by selecting “top-tier 
attorneys” who are expected to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
these undertakings.45  Appointment can be not only expensive, but risky: 
Judges sometimes appoint lawyers for fixed terms, so their performance 
can be assessed and underperformers can be replaced, a circumstance 
that cannot help but make lawyers hearken closely to the judge’s 
preferences.46  A commentator who surveyed pending MDL mass tort 
suits in 2013 concluded that repeat players among the plaintiff’s bar 
garnered almost two thirds of controlling positions in such committees.47  
Expenses and attorney fees are at least sometimes recoverable from this 
fund as the litigation proceeds,48 and the rewards for common benefit 
work can be considerable.49 
Why do defendants want such MDL aggregate mass tort settlements?  
One modern study contends that defendants are willing to pay a 
premium—actually more to settle “the whole batch” of cases brought 
against them than they would pay for all the individual claims if they 
settled one by one—for a “global” MDL settlement (one that covers 
essentially all potential claimants).50  This study focused on a comparison 
between recoveries awarded under the auspices of the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility (GCCF) set up and administered by Kenneth Feinberg and those 
awarded to claimants in the MDL settlement.  Under his leadership, 
GCCF distributed more than $6.2 billion to 220,000 individual claimants 
in 18 months of operation, paying out more than $840 million in its 
second month—extraordinary feats.51  A later audit of the program, 
                                                          
 45.   See Dodge, Facilitative Judging, supra note 10, at 362.   
 46.   See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 617 F. App’x 136, 139 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2015) (declining to “renew” attorney membership in plaintiffs’ steering group and 
appointing new plaintiffs’ advisory committee).  
 47.   Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 96–
101 (2015) (suggesting that this tendency may encourage “uniform” and “less innovative” thinking 
and collusive settlements). 
 48.   For description of the process, see generally Leonard A. Davis & Philip A. Garrett, Case 
Time and Cost Management for Plaintiffs in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 483 (2014); 
Dodge, Facilitative Judging, supra note 10, at 356–60.   
 49.   See In re Oral Sodium Phosphate Sol.-Based Prods. Liab. Action, No. MDL 2066, 2010 
WL 5058454, at *2–5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2010) (reporting on common fund fee-plus-expense 
awards ranging between zero or a few thousand dollars to $1.3 million).  
 50.   Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of 
Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 413–14 (2014) (arguing that settling claimants in BP Oil Spill 
MDL fared better than claimants paid through Gulf Coast Claims Facility, despite higher transaction 
costs in MDL proceedings; defendants will pay a “peace premium” for greater finality and firm cut-
off date).   
 51.   See FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT?, supra note 35, at 125–204 (describing author’s two 
years as administrator of GCCF).   
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conducted at the request of the Department of Justice, concluded that the 
GCCF “operated in an extremely time-sensitive, challenging and 
dynamic environment,” and that in general it “consistently applied its 
protocols and methodologies in processing claims.”52  Nevertheless 
lawsuits arising out of the Gulf oil spill went forward on a parallel track, 
and these were gathered in the MDL process in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, leading finally to a settlement in the amount of approximately 
$18.7 billion.53  Comparing recoveries under this settlement and the 
GCCF payouts led to the conclusion that MDL settlements might 
actually pay claimants more—a kind of global peace premium that some 
defendants are willing to pay. 
There may be another reason why defendants find MDL mass tort 
settlements attractive: They hold out some possibility of staving off 
attempts to certify class litigation.  In the Aqua Dots case the Seventh 
Circuit held that claimants seeking to represent a class under FRCP 
23(b)(3) failed the adequate representation requirement where the 
manufacturer had instituted a voluntary product recall campaign.54  In 
this setting, pursuing class litigation amounted to an attempt to obtain “a 
remedy that most buyers already have received, and that remains 
available.”55  A standard bearer who proposes to incur “high transaction 
costs” for notice and attorney fees to obtain a refund that “already is on 
offer” is not adequately protecting the interests of the class.56 While it 
remains true that many suits gathered in the MDL process do later 
become certified as class suits, the prospect of quicker and easier 
resolution in the MDL settlement process holds some promise of 
blocking certification.57 
                                                          
 52.   BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/697201241917226179477.pdf.  The audit concluded that 
GCCF made errors affecting about one percent of claims and one percent of payouts.  See id. at 6–8.  
It ordered additional payments of $64 million to some 7,300 claimants.  See id. at 2, 7.  
 53.   Margaret Cronin Fisk & Laurel Brubaker Calkins, BP’s $18.7 Billion Oil-Spill Deal Still 
Leaves Lesser Messes, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2015, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-03/bp-s-18-7-billion-oil-spill-deal-still-leaves-
lesser-messes.  
 54.   See In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 55.   Id. at 752. 
 56.   Id. (error to rely on the superiority clause in FRCP 23(b)(3) because recall is not another 
method of adjudicating; the adequate representation requirement supports what trial judge did).  
 57.   See, e.g., Waller v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 295 F.R.D. 472, 482, 488–90 (S.D. Cal. 2013) 
(denying class certification in consumer fraud case against maker of external backup device; the 
availability of software updates means that the class suit would not satisfy the superiority or the 
adequate representation requirements). 
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B. What’s Wrong with MDL Product Liability Settlements? 
Differences of opinion among scholars are commonplace, but the 
disagreement about MDL settlements goes not to details but to the 
substance and the very legitimacy of the undertaking.  Critics—and let us 
call them proceduralists—stress that MDL proceedings go forward 
without legal authority, without standards, and without adversary testing, 
and they argue that transferring control from individual clients and 
lawyers to PMCs violates due process and raises larger questions of 
democratic legitimacy.  Defenders—let us call them aggregationists—
argue that the process produces better outcomes than we could get 
otherwise, that individual rights are adequately protected, and that there 
is little or no difference between the representative character of 
individual suits and the representative character of MDL settlement 
processes. 
1. These Settlements Lack a Basis in Law 
It is a remarkable fact that MDL mass settlements go forward today 
without any basis in statute or rule.  The MDL statute does not 
contemplate final disposition of MDL cases by settlement in the 
transferee forum.  Instead, it mandates return of gathered cases to the 
fora of original filing, and the Lexecon case concluded that the statute 
means what it says—that the authority of the transferee court is limited to 
pretrial matters, and it cannot retain jurisdiction to try gathered cases.58  
In other words, these judicially-encouraged settlements happen in courts 
that lack authority to try the cases they are settling.  In striking contrast 
are class action settlements achieved under Rule 23.  This provision sets 
out criteria designed to assure fairness and confers unusual and 
extraordinary power on courts, and these are surveyed further below.  
The point to be made here is that the Rule 23 safeguards, and the 
extraordinary powers that Rule 23 authorizes courts to exercise, apply to 
class suits and not to MDL litigation. 
What we have, then, is a legal environment in which black letter law 
(FRCP 23) speaks directly to situations closely resembling those that 
lead to MDL gathering.  This law sets limits, establishes criteria, and 
authorizes a degree of judicial supervision and control that is very much 
out of the ordinary.  Into this environment has come MDL mass tort 
                                                          
 58.   See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (transferred cases “shall be remanded” by the JPML “at or 
before the conclusion” of pretrial proceedings “to the district from which [they were] transferred”); 
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40–41 (1998).   
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consolidation that operates free of those limits, ignores those criteria, and 
employs the same extraordinary judicial power.  As Professor Mullinex 
argues, the attempt effectively to invent judicial power to do what MDL 
settlement courts are doing, by resort to the term “quasi-class action,” is 
a thin reed on which to pin the legitimacy of what is really a new 
mechanism.59  There is no hint of an organic or gradual growth of 
doctrine to meet a new situation.  Instead we see an implanting of a new 
term linked to the court’s “general equitable powers.”60  In inventing the 
“quasi-class action” concept in the Zyprexa cases, Judge Weinstein cited 
three things: Rule 23, the American Law Institute (ALI) Complex 
Litigation Project (there is “a strong interest in allowing” MDL 
transferee forum to manage gathered cases “in the way that it believes 
will serve best the interests of justice and efficiency”) and the Manual for 
Complex Litigation (absence of precedent or statutes or rules “should not 
foreclose innovation and creativity”).61  What these references really 
show is the absence of any true foundation for the “quasi-class action.” 
They certainly do not ground the idea in actual doctrine. 
Worse, this development reflects a conscious effort, by lawyers and 
courts alike, to sidestep the safeguards in the one provision in the Rules 
that seems to address the situation confronting courts and litigants in the 
setting of aggregate product claims—namely, Rule 23, and decisions 
implementing this provision.  Chief among these are Amchem62 and 
Ortiz.63  In Amchem, the Court rejected a class settlement, worked out in 
advance, largely because of inadequate representation of persons 
suffering disparate kinds of injury over a long time, and because of the 
difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of notifying asymptomatic persons that 
they are about to be bound by settlement of a suit they have no reason to 
know about.64  In Ortiz, the Court threw out a supposed limited fund 
class settlement because there was in fact no limited fund, and because 
interests of absent claimants were not adequately represented for reasons 
                                                          
 59.   Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 12, at 391–94 (arguing that quasi-class action is 
“a phantasm” mostly invented by Judge Weinstein in Zyprexa cases, as an “attempt to accomplish by 
label what is otherwise prohibited by doctrine”).   
 60.   In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122–23 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 61.   In re Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23; then quoting AM. 
LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT app. B, § 6 cmt. c at 819 (Council Draft No. 4 1992); 
and then quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.1 (2004)); see also In re 
Zyprexa, 233 F.R.D. at 122–23 (“quasi-class action, subject to general equitable powers of the 
courts”). 
 62.   Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 63.   Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 64.   See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622–28. 
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similar to those in Amchem.65  In both Amchem and Ortiz, moreover, 
claimants’ lawyers had the chutzpah to exempt from the settlements 
other cases they were handling (“inventory” claims), in effect waving a 
red flag that betokened favoritism and self-dealing.66  Those claims were 
exempted from the settlements precisely because the lawyers were 
negotiating better deals for their “other” clients (and likely higher fees 
per dollar of recovery), which raises serious ethical questions, to put it 
mildly.67  We should also take into consideration the decisions in Wal-
Mart, which strengthened the common question requirement,68 and the 
series of appellate decisions that “frontload” class certification 
requirements.69  These decisions direct courts carefully to apply class 
action criteria on the basis of evidentiary hearings on the shape of any 
trial and the role of common questions.70  They also insist on careful 
treatment of choice-of-law issues in cases governed by state law,71 and 
they point to the conclusion that the Daubert standard for expert 
testimony applies in certification hearings.72 
Even these observations do not adequately describe problems in the 
legitimacy of MDL settlements.  Arguably court judgments on these 
settlements violate established legal principles.  Some of the Amchem 
principles appear, after all, not only to derive from Rule 23, but also to 
express constitutional standards.  The great stress, for example, on 
differences among claimants, and the suggestion that adequate 
                                                          
 65.   See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842–48 (record fails to demonstrate existence of limited fund).   
 66.   See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600–01, 606–07; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 819.  The Amchem and Ortiz 
decisions discuss the exclusion of inventory claims by claimants represented by counsel for the 
plaintiff class from settlements of the class claims. 
 67.   See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (barring 
representation raising “concurrent conflict of interest,” as occurs if representing one client is 
“directly adverse to another” or there is “a significant risk” that representation of a client “will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” but allowing such conflict if 
lawyer “reasonably believes” that he can “provide competent and diligent representation” to each 
client).   
 68.   See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–59 (2011). 
 69.   See Richard D. Freer, Front-Loading, Avoidance, and Other Features of the Recent 
Supreme Court Class Action Jurisprudence, 48 AKRON L. REV. 721, 721–24 (2015).   
 70.   See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320–24 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(class certification requires findings by a preponderance of the evidence that every requirement of 
FRCP 23 has been met, and a mere “threshold showing” does not suffice).   
 71.   See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740–50 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
nationwide class treatment of claims for nicotine dependence; trial court did not consider effect of 
variations in state law on predominance requirement). 
 72.   See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 353–55 (expressing “doubt” at district court’s conclusion that 
Daubert doesn’t apply in certification hearings); In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 
187 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff cannot rely on challenged expert testimony, when critical to class 
certification, to demonstrate conformity with Rule 23 unless the plaintiff also demonstrates, and the 
trial court finds, that the expert testimony satisfies the standard set out in Daubert.”).   
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representation requires at least the appointment of separate standard 
bearers and counsel for asymptomatic claimants, appears to implement 
due process.73  Hansberry equates adequate representation with due 
process, and the Court in its decision in Shutts reiterated that due process 
requires adequate representation.74 
Amchem also alludes to the importance of an adversary proceeding, 
in which counsel for claimants can credibly suggest that the alternative to 
settlement is trial.75  In offering that comment, the Court rejected the 
argument that appraising the adequacy of settlement could substitute for 
applying the criteria for class certification.76  Of course that is exactly 
what happens in MDL settlements—consideration of fairness and 
adequacy of settlement displaces other considerations.  The comment in 
Amchem could be understood as insisting on a certain reading of Rule 23, 
merely repeating a point made above (MDL procedure lacks a foundation 
in law).  But Martin Redish has argued forcefully that settlement class 
suits should be disallowed because they do not satisfy the case or 
controversy requirement: Part of his argument turns on the fact that 
lawyers approach a court only when they have already agreed that there 
will be no trial (no adversarial contest).77  MDL settlements are different 
because lawsuits have been filed, and could go forward after discovery is 
completed.  But that is not what happens, and much of what is missing in 
settlement classes is also missing in MDL cases: Here too it is possible to 
say, as Professor Redish does say, that judgment on an MDL settlement 
threatens the interests of the absent claimants by binding them to a 
judgment “rendered without the protections and incentives that 
traditionally accompany an adversarial suit.”78 
                                                          
 73.   See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626, 634–35 (3d Cir. 1996) (claimants 
were exposed to “different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time, in different 
ways, and over different periods,” and some claimants “suffer no physical injury or have only 
asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from 
mesothelioma,” and “[e]ach has a different history of cigarette smoking.”); see also Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626). 
 74.   Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 
U.S. 32, 42–43, 45 (1940)) (beyond notice and opportunity to be heard and opt out, due process 
“requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class 
members”).   
 75.   See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621. 
 76.   See id. (“[I]f a fairness inquiry [into the adequacy of settlement] under Rule 23(e) 
controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the 
impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed” because counsel “could 
not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer.”).   
 77.   See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 177–78 (2009).   
 78.   Id. at 210.   
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2. They Turn on Made-Up Rights 
We grew up in our legal education and careers understanding that 
ours is a nation of individual rights.  In different settings the Supreme 
Court has spoken often of civil claims being “choses in action” that are 
property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, 
most famously in the decisions in Mullane79 and Shutts.80  It should go 
without saying, but in any event others have said it, that the holder of 
such rights should be able to choose whether to assert them or not,81 
whether to hire a lawyer or not, whether to sue or not, to select the time 
and place (within limits), and whether to settle or not.82  At least equally 
important, the holder of such rights should be assured that she (or at least 
her representative) can participate actively in any process in which such 
rights are determined.83 
In facing such objections, aggregationists make two moves.  First, 
they reconceptualize rights in group terms.  At least some rights—
apparently those arising from mass torts that happen every day—are 
“owned” by “classes” or “groups” of people, not by individuals, and in 
effect the “party” in mass tort cases is already the “class” or “group,” not 
the individual.84  There is no basis in law for this move and it isn’t 
                                                          
 79.   Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 80.   Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see also Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 
517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 333–35 (1937) (Stone, J., 
concurring); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209–13 (1936); Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. 
Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 289 (1924); Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 258 U.S. 
314, 318 (1922); City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912); 
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 506 (1870).  
 81.   See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 80 (1998) (advancing recourse theory of rights, under which “the state does not judge that 
certain defendants ought to pay certain amounts to plaintiffs,” but instead “the state accedes to, and 
enforces, a plaintiff’s demand that the state compel defendant to pay her a certain amount”).   
 82.   See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict 
Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 113–14 
(2015) (whether viewed from perspective of paternalism or personal autonomy, due process is 
violated by a procedure that selects counsel and representative parties without “opportunity for a 
transparent, adversary-based adjudication” of adequacy and accountability).  
 83.   See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 37–43 (2009) (describing importance of participation in achieving 
accuracy, legitimacy, and claimant satisfaction).   
 84.   See Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt out of Class 
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (classes “take on the form of an ‘entity,’ to 
borrow Professor Shapiro’s term,” and it is hard to view due process in terms of whether “an 
individual right of action may be recreated” in class suits); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The 
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 938–42 (1998) (endorsing entity model in 
mass tort cases involving personal injuries, which has important implications for role of judge and 
choice of law); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 13, 29 (1996) (“[I]maginative use of the entity concept might even support a more rational 
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plausible to assert that individual rights turn into group rights simply 
because there are many violations.  The shift in vocabulary is like 
Sartre’s “magical transformations,” in which human emotions transform 
the world to accommodate deep-felt personal needs and wishes,85 only 
the purpose here is to change the world for everyone, which seems a 
different thing altogether.  In any event, the shift should point the way 
not from individual suits to MDL transfers and settlement, but from 
individual suits to class actions, which require a showing of necessity 
and includes at least some protections for individual claimants. 
Second, aggregationists argue that there isn’t much difference 
between aggregate litigation and individual suits handled by lawyer-
specialists.  In our world, googling things like “hip replacement claims” 
leads to websites of law firms, and popups asking “May We Help You?” 
with offers of free consultation and toll-free phone numbers.  In short, 
people with claims arising from use of drugs or products or from medical 
treatments can locate specialists in minutes.  These are often large firms 
with many similar clients.  In a wide-ranging development of this 
argument, Professors Issacharoff and Witt say the origins of modern tort 
law were in “the machine age,” when the Industrial Revolution of the 
nineteenth century saw more personal injury cases, often suits against 
“large industrial concerns” for workplace injuries, leading to the 
development of both specialized defense bars and plaintiff bars.86  By the 
late twentieth century, they suggest, market forces and the benefits of 
economies of scale led to “concentration of market share on both the 
plaintiff and defense sides,” and to ever more settlements and fewer 
trials, in which “routinized negotiations between established 
representatives” led to settlements based on “grid structures for the 
actuarial treatment of accident claims.”87 
We should acknowledge that choosing such a firm can make good 
sense: Economies of scale mean that a specialist can bring claims quickly 
and efficiently, and can pursue the matter with knowledge and the 
benefits of evidence developed in representing others.  Even 
proceduralists who are skeptical about MDL mass tort settlements 
concede that rational litigants might prefer to be part of a large 
                                                          
approach to choice of law [in class suits].”).   
 85.   See NORMAN K. DENZIN, ON UNDERSTANDING EMOTION 45–47 (1984) (describing 
Sartre’s view, under which an emotion is “a transformation of the world” that occurs when “paths in 
the world are blocked, yet action must go forward, either through necessity or because of desire,” in 
which “the person attempts to change the world by changing his consciousness”).  
 86.   Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An 
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1579–80, 1611 (2004). 
 87.   Id. at 1618.   
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“inventory” of claimants.88  Indeed, probably many clients who wind up 
in MDL proceedings knew from the beginning that their claims would be 
consolidated with others, as specialist firms advertise the advantages of 
combined claims, usually referring to class actions (more familiar to the 
public than MDL).89 
In response to this argument, suffice it to say that it is one thing to be 
a single client among many with similar claims represented by a single 
firm, and quite another thing to be represented by lawyers who are 
sidelined in the MDL process.  Most lawyers in the MDL setting have no 
control over the progress of the suit, and can do effectively nothing for 
their clients except monitor what is going on, often in a distant forum.  
And there is a considerable gulf between a situation in which one firm 
represents scores (even hundreds or thousands) of clients with similar 
claims and a situation in which lawyers represent tens of thousands of 
clients with whom they (or their firms) have had no contact whatsoever.  
A small and localized bureaucracy is easier to deal with than a vast and 
distant bureaucracy. 
3. They Conform to No Standards 
Rule 23 permits certification of classes only if multiple criteria are 
satisfied.  In the usual mass tort setting, Rule 23 requires adequate 
representation, typicality, predominance of common questions, 
manageability, and superiority over individual litigation.  Equally 
important, Rule 23 imposes on courts to implement special safeguards, 
which obligate and empower judges to pass on the question whether 
class treatment is proper (certification provision), to oversee adequacy of 
                                                          
 88.   Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in 
Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 538, 545, 550 (2003) [hereinafter 
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action] (“firms have found niches and gathered large numbers of clients 
with related claims,” and “most clients in mass litigation settings prefer the strength of collective 
representation,” and willingly give up autonomy to achieve economies of scale); Bruce Hay & David 
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1380 n.8 (2000) (“[t]he vote in the marketplace is decidedly against the 
individual benefits of so-called ‘litigant autonomy’”). 
 89.   See, e.g., Class Action Lawsuits, SEEGERWEISS LLP, http://www.seegerweiss.com/class-
actions/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (webpage for New York City law firm) (“For many of the victims 
involved in class action litigation, this is the only meaningful way to attempt to address fraud, 
widespread discrimination or other legal violations.  You can take the case of any class action 
litigation cases against major car companies or major tobacco companies in the past to understand 
how a class action litigation can help.”); Firm Overview and History, LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & 
BERMAN, http://www.lfsblaw.com/overview/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (webpage for Philadelphia 
law firm explaining how partners in the firm serve on guiding committees in major product cases, 
“often involving parallel state and federal court proceedings or Multidistrict Litigation in federal 
court,” and they do so “without losing contact with the individual client”). 
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representation by selecting appropriate counsel and monitor performance 
as the case progresses, to create subclasses when necessary, and to 
accord or limit class treatment.  Rule 23 contains notice provisions that 
assure absent class members that they can intervene or (in most money 
damage suits) opt-out of the suit altogether.  Rule 23 entitles them to be 
heard in settlement hearings.  And Rule 23 creates opportunities for 
interlocutory appeal, particularly at the certification stage. 
Many commentators have argued that even the Rule 23 criteria and 
safeguards are inadequate to assure accuracy and fairness.  Some of these 
critics argue that Rule 23 needs a complete reworking with the idea of 
improving the operation of what is basically a good mechanism.90  
Others would change it but think the present Rule is better than the 
unstructured MDL procedures.91  Yet others think the concept of class 
suits is undemocratic and, particularly in the setting of litigation whose 
goal is almost always settlement and not trial, an unconstitutional 
distortion of the judicial process.92  Indeed, objecting parties approached 
these issues in the Amchem case when they raised questions about 
justiciability and standing, but the reviewing courts did not address 
them.93 
Regardless how one comes out on these questions, it is clear that 
Rule 23 accomplishes three things: It sets standards against which the 
performance of lawyers and courts can be assessed; it addresses real 
concerns; it assures the possibility of review that does not merely defer to 
judicial discretion.  As one able commentator has put it, MDL 
procedures have “stripped away protections afforded by class action 
requirements,” enabling participants to “settle complex cases largely 
unconstrained by law,” creating the “perfect means for negotiating back-
room deals that carry an aura of judicial legitimacy, liberated from the 
constraints of the formal class action rule.”94 
There is an even more fundamental sense in which MDL judgments 
on settlements in mass tort cases lack a legal basis: They rest on the law 
                                                          
 90.   See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional 
Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097 (2013). 
 91.   See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399 (2014). 
 92.   See Redish & Karaba, supra note 82, at 131–51.   
 93.   Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997) (declining to address 
standing, justiciability, or jurisdiction, following “the path taken by the Court of Appeals” in 
disposing of the case by applying class certification criteria).   
 94.   Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 553–54 (2013) [hereinafter Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation]. 
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of no particular state,95 even if the claims advanced in the thousands of 
complaints gathered in this mechanism rest on state law and get into 
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, now expanded by 
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and the Mass Accident statutes.96  
The Court in Shutts announced that considerations of manageability do 
not justify applying forum law in a class suit,97 and the Court commented 
in Amchem that federal courts “lack[] authority to replace state tort 
systems with a national toxic tort compensation regime.”98  
Aggregationists flout these principles, and courts approving MDL 
settlements in mass tort cases seem to think they can be “fair and 
adequate” without considering the substantive laws that would apply to 
such claims if they were litigated in the courts of original filing.  Often 
this appraisal rests on “bellwether” trials conducted in the transferee 
forum and applying variously the laws that might apply to the selected 
samples if they had been tried where originally filed, as happened in the 
Vioxx cases in which bellwether trials went forward in Louisiana (five 
trials) and Texas (one trial) while applying the laws of Florida, South 
Carolina, Kentucky, Utah, and Tennessee.99 
The ALI called for a federal choice-of-law rule more than 50 years 
ago,100 but it never happened.  Probably this step would require 
congressional action, as decisions in the Erie line consistently hold that 
federal courts must apply state choice-of-law rules in diversity cases.101  
Commentators have long urged the creation of federal choice-of-law 
rules, whether by common law evolution or congressional enactment, 
and one commentator even argues that the Constitution requires such 
rules.102  Clearly Congress has not taken this step, although courts in 
                                                          
 95.   But see Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 858, 904–07 (1995) (expressing cautious optimism that class settlements can 
affect tort reform, where courts can hope in exceptional cases to deliver compensation to claimants 
who otherwise would go without recovery). 
 96.   The main provision of the Class Action Fairness Act is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1) 
(2012); the main provision in the Mass Claims Act is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012). 
 97.   Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–23 (1985). 
 98.   Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599. 
 99.   Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, Bellwether Trials, supra note 37, at 2335–36. 
 100.   AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS §§ 2371, 2374 (1969) (proposing statutory change to enable federal courts to apply federal 
choice-of-law rules in certain removed diversity cases). 
 101.   Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 
(2013) (acknowledging principle); Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990); Shutts, 472 
U.S. at 820–23; Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494–97 (1941). 
 102.   See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (arguing that Constitution requires 
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class suits with nationwide reach have sometimes applied the law of the 
place of defendant’s conduct to all claims in order to facilitate class 
treatment,103 and one commentator has argued that CAFA authorizes 
federal courts to begin the task of formulating federal choice-of-law rules 
for such suits.104  Patrick Woolley has replied persuasively, however, that 
that even if Congress or federal courts could federalize choice-of-law 
rules, doing so would profoundly alter the vision of federalism developed 
by Erie and the many decisions that followed.105 
In any event, a federal choice-of-law rule would not solve anything 
unless it pointed toward a single state’s law, as the Institute realized in 
1993 in its recommendations on handling complex litigation.106  Can it 
possibly make sense to retain a system in which state law supplies 
substantive standards that apply to product liability and state courts apply 
their own choice-of-law rules, but federal courts apply a federal choice-
of-law rule in selecting a single state’s substantive law as the rule of 
decision?  Can it possibly make sense to apply the law of one state to 
separate transactions, related only by the fact that they involve some act 
that is repeated in different places and times, or some product or service 
that is provided in different places and times, on the theory that they are 
matters of “national” concern?107  For almost eighty years we have 
understood that there cannot be one justice in federal courts and another 
in state courts—one law applied in diversity cases, and another applied in 
the same litigation in state courts.  What would come of that idea if we 
                                                          
both federal and state courts to apply federal choice-of-law rules, and absent congressional action 
federal courts should fashion such rules). 
 103.   See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 492 (6th ed. 
2010) (commenting that it is “easiest to justify” this result under conventional approaches to choice 
of law if the law thus chosen would give each class member at least as much as the law of his or her 
domicile). 
 104.   Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law 
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1839 (2006) (arguing that federal 
courts after CAFA should apply, absent further congressional action, the laws of defendant’s home 
state when claims arise from “mass-produced goods entering the stream of commerce with no preset 
purchaser or destination”).   
 105.   See Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. 
L. REV. 1723, 1757–63 (2006) (federal choice-of-law rule would take us back to Swift v. Tyson, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), where diversity jurisdiction carried authority to make the law being applied). 
 106.   AM. LAW. INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
WITH REPORTER’S STUDY: A MODEL SYSTEM FOR STATE-TO-STATE TRANSFER AND 
CONSOLIDATION 321–22 (1994) (setting out criteria to be applied “with the objective of applying, to 
the extent feasible, a single state’s law,” and referencing the places of injury, conduct, and domiciles 
of claimants and defendants as relevant elements in choosing).   
 107.   See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 578 
(1996) (“I would have thought that the more ‘national’ the case, the less appropriate it is for any 
single state’s standard to govern.”). 
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established a federal choice-of-law rule?  Suffice it to say that the 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Principles) adopted in 
2010 recognize current realities and draw back from even suggesting 
selection of a single state’s law as a goal.108 
One might think that in twenty-first century America, with almost a 
hundred years of experience in product liability cases, state product 
liability law would be more-or-less uniform.  It turns out, however, that 
Judge Posner’s pointed jab in Rhone-Poulenc was raising an issue that 
matters:109  There is considerable variability on important points in the 
approaches taken to product liability law across the country, much more 
variability than one might expect.110  Hence there is good reason to 
predict that it makes a big difference whether one applies the product 
liability law of California or Florida, for example, hence a big difference 
whether one assesses the fairness of a settlement against one set of 
standards versus another. 
And to bring these questions down to earth, consider this question: Is 
a court judgment based on law if its critical inputs are bellwether trials in 
the transferee forum applying the law of a handful of states with respect 
to claims originating in fifty different states?  In the Vioxx cases, the 
judgment of the court resolved claims by Californians based on estimates 
of the value of almost 33,000 claims, made by lawyers on the PMC and 
lawyers for the defendants in the light shed by the outcomes of six trials 
in Louisiana applying the law of five different states (but not California 
law).111  Can this possibly be what we mean when we say that a court 
applies the law of the land? 
                                                          
 108.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. §§ 2.05 cmt. a, 3.17 cmt. f (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010) (in class suits, contemplating “no change in the body of choice-of-law principles”; in 
MDL cases, referring to “existing choice-of-law principles as they currently stand”). 
 109.   In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting “single trial 
before a single jury instructed in accordance with no actual law of any jurisdiction—a jury that will 
receive a kind of Esperanto instruction, merging the negligence standards of the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia,” and commenting that “one wonders what the Supreme Court thought it was 
doing in the Erie case when it held that it was unconstitutional for federal courts in diversity cases to 
apply general common law rather than the common law of the state whose law would apply if the 
case were being tried” in state court). 
 110.   See Steven P. Zabel & Jeffrey A. Eyres, Conflict of Law Issues in Multistate Product 
Liability Class Actions, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 429, 436–44 (1996) (detailed survey describing 
considerable variability of product liability law). 
 111.   In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 869 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721–22 (E.D. La. 2012) (describing 
settlement in amount of $4.85 billion, payable to 32,886 claimants on basis of  based on six 
bellwether trials). 
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4. They Compromise Lawyer Ethics and Violate Client Rights 
Problems arise when lawyers represent multiple claimants whose 
situations differ—where some claimants should recover more than others 
from the same defendant, and representing one claimant with full vigor 
might detract from representation of others.  In the MDL context, the 
matter of ethical responsibilities is complicated further by the fact that 
lawyers on the PMC may well have obligations not only toward the 
claimants whom they represent (at one remove), but toward the sidelined 
lawyers as well.112  When settlement becomes the form of a zero sum 
game in which the size of each recovery affects the size of others, 
problems of ethical responsibilities are multiplied. 
To begin with a simple point, a lawyer is not supposed to represent a 
client if doing so is “directly adverse to another client” or there is a 
“significant risk” that representing one client is “materially limited” by 
responsibilities toward another.113  A lawyer may undertake such 
representation, however, if she “reasonably believes” she can provide 
“competent and diligent representation” to each client and “each affected 
client gives informed consent.”114  Clients with similar claims often 
consent, and it is at least imaginable that a lawyer could provide enough 
information in the beginning so that the client can give “informed” 
consent.115 
More difficult is the matter of obtaining consent to MDL settlements.  
One might think it a simple task: Each lawyer goes to her clients, 
explains the settlement to each one by one, and the client can agree or 
not.  But it is not so simple.  Each client is entitled to learn the details of 
the proposed agreement, including the treatment of parallel claims 
brought by others.  The reason to require such broad disclosure is that 
such settlements are, in the words of the Principles, “interdependent.”116  
That is to say, they are part of a package in which the willingness of the 
                                                          
 112.   Silver, Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges, supra note 32, at 1987–88, 1990 
(authority on ethical responsibilities of lead lawyers in MDL cases is “surprisingly scarce,” and may 
run toward disabled lawyers who are “at risk of being exploited” along with actual claimants).   
 113.   MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 114.   Id. at r. 1.7(b). 
 115.   See Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 88, at 543, 577–78 (mass collective 
representation allows for economies of scale to reduce the “per-plaintiff cost of pursuing claims,” 
allowing firms to “invest more heavily in the litigation” by evening the stakes between plaintiffs and 
defendants).   
 116.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.16 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (nonclass 
aggregate settlement is “interdependent” if defendant’s acceptance is “contingent upon the 
acceptance by a number of specified percentage of the claimants” or “the value of each claimant’s 
claims [in the settlement] is not based solely on individual case-by-case facts and negotiations”). 
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negotiating lawyers to settle any one claim depends on—or is affected 
by—the resolution of the other claims.  For many lawyers in MDL cases, 
this process is problematic for two reasons: 
First, the reward that comes from settlement incentivizes the lawyer 
representing multiple claimants to recommend and try to sell the 
settlement to every client, regardless whether it is in her best interest.  
Now it is true that in ordinary one-on-one lawyer-client relationships the 
interests of the lawyer and the client do not match exactly.  Indeed, we 
cannot hope to devise a system that solves this problem entirely: It can 
easily happen that a lawyer’s estimate of the amount of recovery after 
trial exceeds defendant’s best settlement offer by a large enough amount 
to suggest that the client would be better off going to trial, while the 
lawyer is better off settling at the amount being offered (taking into 
account the likelihood of success, but putting aside attitudes toward risk).  
The same thing happens in the MDL settlements, but with two critical 
differences: One difference is that in the latter context, the stake of the 
PMC lawyers in selling the deal is exponentially higher because they 
must invest so much money to bring the case forward to settlement.117  
The other difference is that lawyers in the MDL setting may shirk their 
duties to be fully honest with their clients about the range of settlements 
and degree of recovery because getting consent to settle is so important 
to them.118  These problems lend credibility to the suggestion advanced 
by one commentator that the world of aggregate settlement is “full of 
abuse.”119  The problems are exacerbated by the fact that every lawyer 
who is sidelined by the MDL process, when presented with a proposed 
deal, does not know and cannot know much about the litigation.  She did 
not play any part in discovery or negotiation, and her sources of 
                                                          
 117.   Redish & Karaba, supra note 82, at 144 (“[L]ead counsel may push hard for settlement as 
opposed to remand, prefer a quick settlement in favor of a protracted discovery period, or advocate 
for settlement terms that may not be particularly favorable to some or many plaintiffs.”); see also 
Amanda Bronstad, GM Trial Spotlights MDL Flaws, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 8, 2016), 
www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202748997769/GM-Trial-Spotlights-MDL-Flaws (lawyer for one 
claimant in MDL proceeding files court papers alleging that PMC member may have arranged a 
“quid pro quo” with defendant to maximize his fees). 
 118.   See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 
2009 WL 5195841, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009) (fining claimant’s lawyer $50,000 and referring 
him to disciplinary committee for failing properly to advise clients of range of permissible recovery 
in MDL settlement); Howard M Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 979, 985–86 (2010) (describing lawyer misconduct in fen-phen litigation in failing to tell 
settling claimants full amount of settlement, leading to disbarment and prison). 
 119.   Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied 
Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1797 (2004) (referring to class actions; 
her argument seems equally applicable to MDL settlements). 
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information are lawyers on the PMC who did the work and conducted the 
negotiations. 
Second, a proposed MDL settlement implicitly obligates 
participating lawyers on the PMC to “sell” the deal to clients and other 
lawyers for claimants.  Indeed, it has happened that such proposals 
expressly impose a duty on participating lawyers to decline further 
representation for a client who refuses the deal.  Such an obligation puts 
the lawyer in a conflicted position and is unethical, as a lawyer cannot 
ethically drop a client merely because he refuses to settle.120  It is hardly 
an improvement on the situation that the implicit understanding among 
PMC negotiators is that they are to sell the deal to the other lawyers and 
they in turn are to convince each of their clients in their one-by-one 
conversations with them. 
The matter of client consent is further vexed by a new practice, 
endorsed by a provision in the Principles, in which lawyers can ask their 
clients to consent in advance to an MDL settlement proposal if it is 
approved by a “substantial majority” of claimants.121  The difficulty with 
this proposition is that such consent cannot satisfy even a limp version of 
the “informed consent” standard because neither the client nor the 
lawyer, on agreeing to it, can have any actual idea what the settlement 
will be.  A lawyer representing more than one client is not supposed to 
participate “in making an aggregate settlement” unless each client “gives 
informed consent” after a consultation that shall include disclosure of 
“the existence and nature of all the claims . . . and of the participation of 
each person in the settlement.”122  In taking the position that this 
protection can be waived in an advance agreement to accept a settlement 
supported by a “substantial majority” of similar claimants,123 the 
Principles reject significant modern authority finding advance consent 
invalid.124  Indeed, this proposition is an affront to common sense, and 
strong criticisms separately advanced years ago by Professors Nancy 
Moore and Howard Erichson are entirely convincing.125 
                                                          
 120.   See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (lawyer “shall 
abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter”).   
 121.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 122.   MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 123.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17, cmt. b. 
 124.   E.g., Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 522 (N.J. 2006) (agreeing that 
Rule 1.8(g) bars a lawyer “from obtaining consent in advance from multiple clients that each will 
abide by a majority decision in respect of an aggregate settlement”). 
 125.   See Erichson & Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, supra note 11, at 292–311; Nancy J. 
Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 149, 165 (1999) (lawyers cannot agree to settlement “over the objection of any 
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PARTY CHALLENGE TO MDL SETTLEMENTS 
The mechanisms of class suits and MDL converge at a critical 
point—the point of appraising the fairness of proposed settlements.  In 
MDL and class suits alike, the court conducts an inquiry into fairness and 
adequacy, and it does so without benefit of the critical voices of most of 
the claimants.  Invariably the court has encouraged negotiations between 
the PMC and defense counsel; invariably it is they who present the 
proposed settlement to the court and argue that it is fair.  Now the court 
shoulders the unenviable task of trying to achieve neutrality while taking 
a cold look at the deal produced under its prodding, and without the 
benefit of adversary presentation. 
A. Initial Review for Fairness and Adequacy 
As noted above, class suits accommodate objectors,126 and in MDL 
cases there is little doubt that outside lawyers for dissatisfied plaintiffs—
that is to say, lawyers who are not active in the pretrial preparation 
because they were not appointed to the PMC or any other committee—
can appear and try to get the attention of the court to voice any complaint 
about the proposed deal.  We have no Rule or other black letter law that 
guarantees such an opportunity, but it is inconceivable that a judge with a 
legal education would refuse to hear from claimants at this point in the 
process. 
More importantly, however, objectors seldom appear—both in class 
suits and MDL proceedings.  One reason is the low likelihood of success.  
Another is that claimants in aggregate suits usually don’t have effective 
personal representation (in class suits, they usually don’t have their own 
lawyers; in MDL proceedings most lawyers for claimants have been cut 
out of the game).  In MDL suits, many sidelined lawyers are in states 
distant from the transferee forum.  They have played no role.  Their 
participation has been actively discouraged.  In sum, they are ill-prepared 
to second guess a settlement put together by the PMC and the defense 
lawyers.  Unless these sidelined lawyers invest time digging into the case 
                                                          
plaintiff, even when that plaintiff has agreed in advance to be bound by a vote of a majority”).  But 
see Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997) (arguing that clients should be able to agree in advance to a majority-
approved settlement). 
 126.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  Rule 23(e) requires notice to class members “who would be bound” 
by the settlement, and a hearing where “any class member” may object, and requires in subsection 
(b)(3) that damage suits class members, even if already given an opportunity to opt out, must be 
given another opportunity. 
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(with no assurance and little prospect of compensation) and then 
essentially force themselves on the judge and the PMC like uninvited 
guests at a party, they will have no voice in what happens.  These 
sidelined lawyers know their clients may be bound by the settlement 
even if they reject it: The expectation is that almost everyone will agree, 
and the concurrence of a substantial majority may be enough to bind 
everyone. 
B. Wait a Minute: Who Empowered Courts to Review Private 
Agreements? 
It is actually not clear that courts have authority to review MDL 
settlements at all: Once again we have no black letter law comparable to 
Rule 23(e), which authorizes such a function in certified class suits.  
Indeed, FRCP 41 provides that plaintiff “may dismiss an action without a 
court order” by filing a stipulation signed by “all parties who have 
appeared,”127 and arguably courts in such cases have no authority to do 
anything but dismiss the suit.128  Settlements are theoretically matters of 
private contract, and nothing in the MDL mechanism transforms 
gathered claims and settlement negotiations into anything else.129  In 
another context, the Supreme Court has held that a federal court that 
enters judgment dismissing a suit on the basis of private settlement does 
not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.130 
We have multiple indications, however, that in practice (whatever 
the Rules might say and whatever might be “the law”) courts have taken 
it upon themselves to play a role, as happened in the Vioxx litigation and 
the World Trade Center cases.  In the latter, the parties announced a 
settlement and did not ask the court’s opinion or invite its participation, 
but Judge Hellerstein injected himself into the process, later explaining 
himself thus: 
                                                          
 127.   FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 128.   See Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(dismissal signed by all parties under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is “self-executing and dismisses 
the case” on becoming effective, which occurs “upon filing unless it explicitly conditions its 
effectiveness on a subsequent occurrence”).   
 129.   See Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1015, 1024 (2013) (claimants own their claims; it is claimant’s prerogative to dismiss in 
exchange for compensation; “unauthorized judicial approval may cause just as much mischief as 
unauthorized judicial rejection”); Grabill, supra note 11, at 165–67 (“unless the parties jointly seek 
court approval or oversight,” courts “have no authority to evaluate, approve, oversee the 
implementation of, or reject” mass tort settlements). 
 130.   Kokkonen v. Guardian Life. Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–81 (1994) (after 
dismissing with prejudice, court does not retain ancillary jurisdiction to enforce settlement).   
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Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor any other rule or law 
specifically sets out the role of the court in a coordinated mass tort 
litigation.  And there is no authority that explicitly calls for the court to 
condition approval of a mass settlement on fairness hearings or on 
compliance with judicially crafted procedural requirements.  These 
things are necessary, however, because the court is the only participant 
to the proceedings that is truly neutral, and only the court can ensure 
that conflicts arising in the representation do not unfairly harm 
plaintiffs, give rise to invidious distinctions among plaintiffs, or unduly 
advantage defendants.131 
As noted earlier, the World Trade Center litigation was a “one-off” in 
that it went forward under a special statute conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction over “all actions brought for any claim” against air carriers 
arising out of the September 11th attacks,132 and the claims pending 
before Judge Hellerstein were gathered under Rule 42, not the MDL 
statute.133  Still, this litigation shows that a court acting in the setting of 
consolidated litigation can claim authority not found in black letter law 
to pass on the fairness of settlements. 
A third indication that judges in MDL cases have such authority is 
found in the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, which 
are of course not intended to “restate the law as we have it,” but rather to 
guide courts as they venture into uncharted territory.  As Professor 
Mullenix has pointed out, the choice of language in the title implies that 
MDL proceedings and class suits are of a piece—variants on a single 
theme.134  Hence it is not surprising that the Principles includes a 
provision that authorizes judicial approval of MDL settlements, and it is 
                                                          
 131.   Alvin K. Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass Tort Litigation: Judicial Management to 
Enhance Claimants’ Participation and Control, 41 BRIEF 16, 18 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (original 
bargain “provided too little for the plaintiffs, and too much for their lawyers,” and “contained 
procedures that lent themselves to arbitrary determinations”).   
 132.   See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 
408(b)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) (signed into law eleven days after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, creating the Victim Compensation Fund and channeling litigation into federal court 
in New York); see generally FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?, supra note 35, at 169–72 
(describing process run by the author on pro bono basis that distributed more than $7 billion to 
claimants).   
 133.   See Mariani v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11628, 2002 WL 1685382, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2002) (ordering consolidation of all suits arising out of World Trade Center 
disaster consolidated under FED. R. CIV. P. 42); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (providing that actions pending 
before a federal district court may be joined or consolidated if they “involve a common question of 
law or fact”). 
 134.   See Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 94, at 541 (noting that “nonclass aggregate 
contractual settlement” is a term that “deliberately resonates in the familiar language of the class 
action while simultaneously rejecting the class concept,” now institutionalized in the ALI’s 
Principles). 
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also not surprising (for a very different reason) that the Principles view 
the role of the court as limited.135  In any event, the Principles include a 
provision (the very last one) titled “Limited Judicial Review for Non-
Class Aggregate Settlements.”136  This provision says that any claimant 
who agrees to be bound by a settlement favored by a substantial majority 
may “challenge” it on grounds of technical irregularities or because it is 
not “procedurally and substantively fair and reasonable,” and provides 
further that such challenge may be brought in MDL cases in the 
transferee forum or “in any court of competent jurisdiction.”137  The 
Principles also include a provision stating that “enforceability” of an 
MDL settlement depends on whether it is “fair and reasonable” from 
both a “procedural standpoint” and a substantive standpoint.138 
The comment going with this provision says procedural fairness is 
more likely when claimants “share some prior relationship that 
accustoms them to working together,” adding that “common membership 
in a trade association or union” makes procedural fairness of a negotiated 
deal more likely, and it cites “asbestos claimants with no prior 
relationship to one another and relatively different claims” as a situation 
where more care is required.139  “Substantive” fairness may turn, in the 
words of the Principles, on consideration of “the costs, risks, probability 
of success, and delays in achieving a verdict” and on whether claimants 
are “treated equitably (relative to each other) based on their facts and 
circumstances” and on whether “particular claimants are disadvantaged 
by the settlement considered as a whole.”140  Not surprisingly, these 
substantive criteria resemble those developed by courts applying FRCP 
23(e) in appraising class action settlements.141  The provision goes on to 
say that such claimants may also challenge “the amount of his or her 
share” on grounds of fairness.142 
Given these indicators, it seems likely that the practice of judges 
passing on MDL settlements will become universally recognized and—at 
                                                          
 135.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Id. at § 3.18(a). 
 138.   Id. at § 3.17(d)–(e), cmt. e.   
 139.   Id. at § 3.17 cmt. d(5).   
 140.   Id. at § 3.17(e), cmt. e. 
 141.   The Civil Rules Advisory Committee is studying the question whether to amend FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 to include criteria for judging the adequacy of settlements.  See ADVISORY COMM. ON 
CIVIL RULES, Rule 23 Subcommittee Report, in AGENDA BOOK: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES 247–48 (Apr. 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2015-04.pdf. 
 142.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18(b). 
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least in that sense—achieve legitimacy.143  Even though litigants in MDL 
cases could simply agree to settlement and a judgment of dismissal, they 
are more likely to prefer an order of the court that contains and endorses 
the terms of the agreement.  Arguably this approach necessarily means 
that the court is involved in settlement: Adding a court order is not a 
mere formality.  For one thing, it enables the parties to invoke the 
protections of claim preclusion, over which they have considerable 
control because the terms of the agreement can specify the nature and 
extent of claim preclusion.144  For another thing, entry of judgment may 
enable claimants to enforce the settlement by execution (and may confine 
the extent of execution), although such judgments are also treated as 
judicially-approved contracts, and it is not always the case that they can 
be enforced by writ as opposed to further proceedings seeking judicial 
enforcement.145  In sum, the judgment and accompanying order mean 
that the settlement is no longer merely a contract, but an official act that 
puts the authority of the court behind the agreement and sometimes 
extends the authority of the court over the agreement.146 
It seems worth considering the possibility that a claimant who does 
not agree to a settlement can object and, if overruled, continue to 
challenge it.  Of course the expectation is nay-saying claimants will say 
                                                          
 143.   See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 334, 334 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., 
concurring) (“there is no prescribed independent review of the structural and substantive fairness of 
a settlement” outside of class actions, but “some MDL transferee judges have treated the MDL 
proceedings as quasi class actions and restricted contingent fee agreements in non-class aggregate 
settlements under their equitable and supervisory powers”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (reviewing settlement 
in MDL for good faith to protect settling defendants against contribution claims by nonsettling 
defendants). 
 144.   18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4443 (2d ed. 2002) (“consent judgments ordinarily support claim 
preclusion but not issue preclusion,” and claim preclusion “may extend to claims that were not even 
formally presented,” but issue preclusion is often denied on the basis of “intent of the parties and the 
lack of any actual adjudication”).  
 145.   See Andrews v. Roadway Express Inc., 473 F.3d 565, 568, 568 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(consent decree approved by judicial order is a “judgment” for purposes of FED. R. CIV. P. 69); 
United States v. Kellum, 523 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1975) (“consent decree is [i]n many 
respects . . . a contract between the parties,” but it also has “the same force and effect as any other 
judgment until set aside in the manner provided by law”).  See also Note, The Consent Judgment as 
an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1316–17 (1959) (consent 
judgments are “ordinarily enforcible [sic] in the same manner as other judgments,” and treating them 
as mere contracts would “remove one incentive” to settle and require “consumption of additional 
judicial resources,” but a court should not be compelled by consent of the parties “to grant a type of 
relief which it would not have granted had the action been contested,” and courts can modify consent 
decrees). 
 146.   See Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449–50, 449 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (where court’s 
order of dismissal “expressly provided that the parties could, within 60 days, move to reopen the 
case to enforce the settlement,” court retained jurisdiction).   
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nothing after rejecting the proposal: They are expected to pursue their 
own remedies in the pending litigation, although they must first persuade 
the transferee forum to return their cases to the courts of original filing, 
or to other courts where venue would be proper for unsettled claims.  In 
the Vioxx case, dissenting claimants sought to challenge the settlement 
but the judge disallowed the challenge and the Fifth Circuit rejected their 
appeal.147  The Principles appear to agree with this view, as they provide 
only for challenges to a settlement by persons otherwise bound by it.148  
Left out are plaintiffs who reject the settlement.  The notion is that if one 
is not bound, why should he complain about those who agree to what 
was proposed?  Arguably, however, even claimants who reject a 
settlement as unfair should be able to continue to challenge it.  Such a 
claimant is not a disinterested bystander, and she too expects fair 
treatment from the PMB and from any settlement.  She should have not 
only the option of accepting a settlement or pursuing her own remedy, 
but also the option of objecting that a deal reached with the leverage 
provided by her claim, by lawyers purporting to represent her interests, is 
unfair or inadequate.149 
C. Later (Collateral) Challenge 
The question whether an MDL settlement is open to later challenge 
may seem unworthy of consideration: Of course settlements may be set 
aside if they are not performed, and on other grounds that apply 
generally to relief from contractual obligations.  But one attraction of 
MDL settlements is that they are arrangements that enjoy both judicial 
imprimatur and contractual commitment, and the latter element in their 
nature supposedly immunizes them from attack that might succeed in 
cases in which such arrangements enjoy only the former—on grounds 
relating to inadequacy, unfairness, or failures by lawyers adequately to 
represent claimants. 
                                                          
 147.   See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 
TransAm. Ref. Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 952 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1992)) (“non-settling parties 
generally have no standing to challenge the settlement”).   
 148.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (any 
claimant “who is subject to a settlement” can bring a challenge). 
 149.   See Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t., 407 F.3d 755, 760–64 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(allowing collateral attack on judgment dismissing putative class suit; court erred there in entering 
judgment of dismissal, based on settlement of named plaintiffs’ claims, by failing to provide notice 
to members of putative class; earlier judgment was void). 
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1. Effect of the Impact of Common Law (Contract; Agency; 
Professional Responsibility) 
The consent of claimants (and of course defendants) to a settlement 
helps produce a durable closure, and contract principles help achieve this 
result.  For example, a contracting party cannot avoid her obligations on 
ground of mistake if the contract allocates to her the risk of mistake or if 
circumstances make it reasonable to allocate that risk to her.150  
Specifically in the area of settlement agreements, efforts to set them 
aside typically fail, and courts stress the importance of such agreements 
and emphasize that public policy favors them.151 
Yet contract law is not an insuperable barrier: One party’s mistake 
on a “basic assumption” underlying an agreement makes it voidable if 
enforcement would be “unconscionable.”152  Settlement contracts may 
also be set aside for fraud, which can include erroneous advice to the 
settling party about elements of recovery that a claimant is losing in 
agreeing to settle.153  And the law of professional responsibility affects 
the enforceability of settlements.  If the client’s informed consent was 
not obtained, or if she purported to waive her right to informed consent 
by agreeing in advance to be bound by a substantial majority vote and 
the waiver is invalid (as indicated by current law), the settlement can be 
set aside.  Dissatisfied claimants in MDL cases have in fact mounted 
such arguments, generally without success.154 
                                                          
 150.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (contracting party 
bears risk of mistake if it is “allocated to him” or he knows he has “limited knowledge” of the facts 
but “treats his limited knowledge as sufficient” or risk is “allocated to him by the court” as 
reasonable).  
 151.   See, e.g., Mardanlou v. Gen. Motors Corp., 69 F. App’x 950, 951–52 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(refusing to set aside judgment on settlement of personal injury claim against auto maker and 
rejecting claim that plaintiff was pressured to settle and was “easily manipulated and persuaded” 
because he was on medication during negotiations).   
 152.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (where a party’s mistake on “a basic 
assumption” underlying her agreement has a “material” and “adverse” effect on the agreed 
exchange, the agreement is voidable if she “does not bear the risk of the mistake” and enforcement 
would be “unconscionable” or “the other party had reason to know of the mistake” or in fact “caused 
the mistake”).   
 153.   See Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Expl., 182 P.3d 1079, 1094–95 (Alaska 2008) (worker 
who settled compensation claim with employer could set it aside on ground of “constructive fraud, 
duress, or misrepresentation,” including material misrepresentation relating to claimant’s eligibility 
for permanent total disability benefits); Coaker v. Wash. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 646 So. 2d 38, 38–41 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (even innocent representations of material fact on which plaintiff relies can 
show fraud that would justify setting aside settlement; here plaintiff did not get the “light duty” he 
was promised, which showed fraud and permits court to set aside settlement).   
 154.   See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 
public policy favoring settlements).   
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The enforceability of an MDL settlement is also affected by agency 
law, quite apart from principles of contract and professional 
responsibility.  The lawyer as agent for his client has a duty to inform her 
of facts that the lawyer “knows or has reason to know that the principal 
would wish to have” or that are “material to the agent’s duties to the 
principal.”155  And the lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to her client, which 
entails not working for the lawyer’s own benefit outside the terms of the 
agency and not working for other principals with whom the agent is 
dealing.156 
2. Effect of Preclusion Law (Hansberry, Principles of Aggregate 
Litigation) 
There is no doubt that claim preclusion law operates in connection 
with an MDL judgment based on a settlement agreement, at least to the 
extent that the parties so provide.  In other words, assuming that a 
consent judgment is procedurally valid (rendering court has jurisdiction; 
judgment comports with due process) and the underlying agreement so 
provides, the judgment resolves claims that were brought and that might 
have been brought. 
The harder question is whether MDL judgments on aggregate 
settlements are subject to collateral challenge raising issues of due 
process unrelated to jurisdiction—due process issues turning on adequate 
representation and the fairness and adequacy of the settlement.  Here we 
enter a nether region, and it is arguable that preclusion law has nothing to 
say.  We are talking now about issue preclusion, which applies to issues 
“actually litigated” (and necessary to a final judgment).157  Although 
adequate representation is “actually litigated” in class suits at the 
certification stage, it is not litigated—at least formally—in MDL 
litigation leading to settlement.  Indeed, avoiding this question is part of 
the charm of MDL litigation.158  In short, it is at least possible, as one 
                                                          
 155.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 156.   See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (lawyer shall 
not represent client if representation “will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the 
lawyer”).   
 157.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (issue preclusion 
applies to “an issue of fact or law” that was “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment” and is “essential to the judgment”). 
 158.   The other branch of preclusion law (claim preclusion, or res judicata) comes into play.  
One of the attractions of aggregate litigation for defendants is closure, and a valid MDL judgment on 
a settlement forecloses further litigation of claims actually brought and those that might have been 
brought. 
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observer has lamented, that MDL settlements represent “a triumph of 
contract over constitution,” and that due process is simply irrelevant.159 
But this conclusion is hard to accept.  After all, there is a court 
judgment, and the judgment (not just the underlying agreement) is 
instrumental in concluding claims (a kind of property right), and perhaps 
in enforcing them by execution or by the sheer force of official 
endorsement.  So it cannot really be that issues of adequate 
representation and other aspects of due process are irrelevant. 
Perhaps equally important, it seems that the transferee court in MDL 
cases decides, at least implicitly, issues of adequate representation on 
account of due process concerns.  Although the court acts without 
guidance of rule or statute, and without any formal mechanism allowing 
review, the court does appoint the PMC, and does supervise fee 
arrangements for the PMC and the sidelined lawyers, and does pass on 
the fairness and adequacy of settlement, rejecting settlements that are not 
fair and adequate.  The matter of adequate representation has to be a 
factor in all these matters. 
If due process is indeed relevant, there must be a way of raising the 
point in a later suit, although the Principles assume otherwise.  The MDL 
gathering mechanism leaves the various suits pending in the courts of 
original filing while depriving those courts of “jurisdiction” to take any 
further action.160  Building on this reality, the Principles allow for 
challenge to an MDL settlement only in the court where the action is 
pending after transfer (the transferee forum),161 and they do not refer to 
due process or adequate representation as such.  They envision 
challenges leading to inquiry in four areas—whether consent to the 
settlement was properly obtained, whether clients received adequate 
advice on options, whether the full terms of the settlement were 
disclosed, and whether the settlement was “substantively fair and 
reasonable.”162  Of course all these issues are significant, and they relate 
to the questions of due process and adequate representation.  But missing 
                                                          
 159.   See Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering Aggregationist, 15 NEV. L.J. 1455, 
1471 (2015). 
 160.   Transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) don’t result in dismissing the original suits (they 
are still “pending” in transferor fora), but full authority goes to the transferee forum.  See Glasstech, 
Inc. v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (on transfer, transferor forum is 
“divested of jurisdiction”). 
 161.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (in a 
nonclass aggregate settlement, claimant is entitled to mount a challenge, but the challenge is to be 
brought where claimant’s case “is or was pending or, if no case is or was pending, in any court of 
competent jurisdiction”). 
 162.   Id. at §§ 3.17–3.18. 
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from the Principles is any broader recognition of such issues, of the sort 
that can be raised in class actions, or any willingness to allow collateral 
challenge in a new lawsuit. 
It should be instructive to consider the law governing collateral 
challenge to judgments in class suits based on claims of inadequate 
representation.  Most informative are three critical cases and the position 
taken by the Principles, although the cases and the academy are deeply 
divided on this subject. 
The first case is Hansberry, which holds that a judgment in a class 
action can be challenged in a later suit brought by claimants whose rights 
were purportedly adjudicated in the earlier suit as members of the 
class.163  There are many reasons why Hansberry came out as it did, not 
least being reluctance to enforce a racial covenant, the fact that the new 
plaintiffs could not have been identified in the earlier suit or in any way 
included in it, the fact that they didn’t fit the purported class (they would 
resist the covenant; the class sought to enforce it), and the fact that the 
defendant in the earlier suit (whose interests did line up with those of the 
new plaintiff) did not purport to represent a class.164  Hansberry requires 
the new court to take what we can call a “second look” at what the first 
court did, to decide whether the new plaintiff’s interests were adequately 
represented before, and Hansberry holds that the matter of adequate 
representation is key to insuring due process.165 
Second is the Epstein case, which stands for the proposition that 
collateral challenge to a class judgment for inadequate representation is 
not proper.166  Here too, other forces are in play.  The case brought issues 
of full faith and credit because the suit leading to judgment on a 
settlement was a derivative action in state court in Delaware, and the 
other suit was a class action in federal court in California raising 
exclusively federal claims (Hansberry did not raise issues of full faith 
and credit, or the effect of a state court settlement on exclusively federal 
claims).167  Not surprisingly, given its decision in Marrese that state 
preclusion law governs the effect of state judgments, even on claims that 
                                                          
 163.   Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1940).  Eight years later the Court confronted the 
question it avoided by disposing of Hansberry on procedural grounds.  See generally Jay Tidmarsh, 
The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class Action, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 233 
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1948) (holding that 
racial covenants are unenforceable). 
 164.   See generally Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37–46. 
 165.   See id. at 43–44. 
 166.   See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein III), 179 F.3d 641, 648–50 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 167.   Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein (Epstein I), 516 U.S. 367, 369–73 (1996). 
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can only be brought in federal court,168 the Court held in Epstein I that 
the federal court in the second suit was to apply Delaware preclusion 
law, but it declined to say whether adequate representation could be 
raised in the California suit.169  On remand, the Ninth Circuit held in 
Epstein II that adequacy of representation in the Delaware suit could be 
reviewed,170 but on rehearing after a change in personnel (and one 
judge’s change of mind), the Ninth Circuit in Epstein III concluded that 
collateral review was barred after all, because the matter of adequate 
representation had been adjudicated in the original suit.171 
Third is the Stephenson case, which (like Hansberry) stands for the 
proposition that a judgment in a class action is open to challenge later by 
a claimant whose rights were purportedly adjudicated because he was a 
member of the class.172  Again, many forces are in play.  First, the new 
plaintiff (like the new plaintiff in Hansberry) could not have been 
identified during the earlier suit (he was asymptomatic), and the 
reviewing court in the new suit said no court had addressed the question 
of adequate representation for him or people like him.173  Second, 
Stephenson came after Amchem and Ortiz had condemned use of class 
judgments to resolve future claims, which is what the Agent Orange 
judgment challenged in Stephenson purported to do.174  Finally, some of 
the ironies that mark the Agent Orange case reappeared in Stephenson: 
Judge Winter’s opinion for the Second Circuit affirmed Judge 
Weinstein’s judgment in Agent Orange while taking the view that class 
certification is inappropriate in mass exposure cases—in effect saying 
“we’ll uphold what you did, but this is not usually the kind of case that 
merits class treatment.”175  And the later Stephenson claims wound up 
before Judge Weinstein, who dismissed them on the merits as barred by 
                                                          
 168.   Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381–87 (1985). 
 169.   Epstein I, 516 U.S. at 379 n.5 (declining to address due process claim of inadequate 
representation “because it is outside the scope of the question presented in this Court”).  See also id. 
at 395–99 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Justice Ginsburg also declines to resolve this issue). 
 170.   Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Epstein II), 126 F.3d 1235, 1243–51 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing 
Delaware judgment and concluding that plaintiffs in the California suit were not adequately 
represented), withdrawn, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 171.   Epstein III, 179 F.3d at 648–50 (concluding that collateral review is foreclosed). 
 172.   Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Hansberry for 
principle that propriety of collateral challenge to class judgments is “amply supported,” and stating 
that these rest on “due process concerns”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). 
 173.   See id. (no court has yet addressed “the adequacy of representation for those members of 
the class whose injuries manifested after depletion of the settlements [sic] funds”). 
 174.   See id. at 257–61. 
 175.   See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 165–67 (2d Cir. 
1987) (expressing skepticism toward class treatment of mass tort cases, but affirming class treatment 
here because government contractor defense raised critical common question).   
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the military contractor defense—in effect saying that “the original 
claimants were entitled to victory because they cooperated and settled,” 
and “you are entitled to a collateral attack because the reviewing court 
said so,” but “you can’t recover because really nobody is entitled to 
recover on account of the military contractor defense.”176 
Into this disarray stepped the Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation in 2010.  As noted above, they include a provision that is close 
to Epstein III in barring most collateral challenges to judgments in class 
actions, on the theory that the matter of adequate representation was 
actually adjudicated in the original suit, so errors on this point should be 
addressed on direct appeal.  The Principles do allow collateral challenges 
claiming that the original court lacked personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction, or failed “to make the necessary findings of adequate 
representation” or to afford “reasonable notice and an opportunity to be 
heard as required by applicable law.”177  Otherwise, however, collateral 
challenges are blocked.  Importantly, the Principles limit even direct 
challenges raising issues of adequate representation, contemplating 
corrective measures only for “structural conflicts of interest,” meaning 
those “in existence at the time of the aggregation decision” or that 
“emerge in the course of the aggregate litigation.”178 
3. Policy Arguments Favoring Collateral Challenge 
As a beginning point, we should remember that the rendering court 
does not decide what effect should be given to a judgment in a later suit, 
a proposition that applies as much to class suits as to others.  In the 
ordinary case, of course, she simply determines which parties are bound 
by the earlier judgment, what issues were necessarily resolved and what 
claims were covered, and those considerations determine the preclusive 
effect of the earlier judgment.179  There is no “second look” in the sense 
                                                          
 176.   In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 44–45 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(manufacturers were entitled to government contractor defense; claims dismissed), aff’d sub nom. 
Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(affirming dismissal on ground of government contractor defense).   
 177.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.14(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  
Under the Principles, “direct appeal” is “the normal vehicle” for challenging a judgment based on a 
class settlement.  See id. at § 3.14(a) (also exempting what might be called direct challenges in form 
of motions for relief from judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) or similar provisions).   
 178.   See id. at § 2.07(a)(1), cmt. d.  
 179.  In ordinary circumstances—imagine one plaintiff suing one defendant, and later suing the 
same defendant on the same claim again.  Here the second judge must resolve the technical points: 
Are they really the same parties?  Is it really the same claim or same transaction?  Once those 
questions are answered, the prior judgment either controls the later case or it has no impact at all. 
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of examining adequacy of representation.  For four good reasons, 
however, aggregate litigation—both class suits and MDL judgments on 
settlements—is and should be different. 
First, the risk of unjust results for claimants is magnified when 
multiple claims are resolved en masse.  Even assuming that lawyers are 
thorough, a settlement is likely to overcompensate some and 
undercompensate others.  It is true that problems with asymptomatic 
claimants, of the sort that appeared in class litigation in Ortiz and 
Amchem, are less likely in MDL cases: Each MDL claimant has a lawyer 
and filed suit, which usually means he knows about and suffers current 
injuries.  Still, the difficulties that come with suits for ongoing ailments 
or injuries, which include variation in the nature and severity of harms, 
estimating the future course of events, and trying to compensate for 
ongoing treatment or suffering or losses, are magnified in all aggregate 
litigation (class suits and MDL cases alike).  Combining claims leads to 
categorizing and constructing grids in an effort to achieve similar 
treatment for similarly-situated claimants.  Indeed, the effort may even 
lead, in the interest of compromise, to a settlement that pays each 
claimant the same amount, which at least avoids the corrosive effects of 
administrative costs on total recovery.  It is these realities that stand 
behind the provision in the Principles that let claimants, even after 
having agreed to a settlement, challenge it in the rendering court as 
“substantively” unfair.180 
Second is the powerful reason that this article examines.  Because no 
real testing attends MDL settlements, the best chance for a critical look 
comes when a claimant allegedly bound by it hires a lawyer and brings 
another suit.  We have seen why—the active players in MDL settlements 
are the lawyers who negotiate the deal and the judge who presides over 
it, and they all want to get the settlement approved.  The cautious attitude 
toward binding nonparties to a judgment, as evinced in Hansberry and 
reiterated in more recent decisions, is best understood as paving the way 
for collateral review because of an abiding suspicion that aggregate 
treatment of claims ventures so far from our ideal of personalized justice 
that the outcome demands a departure from our approach to conventional 
litigation, in which aggregate judgments can be tested for fairness not 
                                                          
 180.   PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18(a).  Illustration 3 indicates that a 
claimant who signed a valid waiver of the right to reject a settlement approved by most other 
claimants may mount “a timely challenge” if each claimant is to receive “the same amount of 
money” even though some “suffered serious permanent injuries, while others suffered only minor or 
temporary injuries.”  Id. at § 3.18 illus. 3.  This example illustrates a challenge raising issues of 
“substantive fairness.” 
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only by the original judge, but by a later judge when a new claimant 
argues that the original judgment does not resolve her rights.181 
Third, the transferee forum has no specific criteria to apply in 
gauging the propriety of moving beyond discovery into trial or settlement 
because these outcomes are foreclosed by the terms of the MDL statute.  
Class suits under Rule 23 must satisfy common question, typicality 
predominance, manageability, and superiority requirements, and 
provision is made for subclasses, for treatment of selected issues on a 
classwide basis, and for intervention by class members.  And the trial 
court has an ongoing duty to insure that counsel acts in the best interests 
of the class.  In contrast, cases gathered under the Multi-District 
Litigation statue need only satisfy a “common question” standard, with 
almost everything left to the unguided discretion of the trial judge. 
Fourth, the consent of the clients of sidelined lawyers is not likely to 
reflect a genuine choice.  Lawyers are sometimes expressly obliged to try 
to sell the deal, but they’re inclined in that direction even not formally 
obligated, to the point that they are sorely tempted to give short shrift to 
their ethical duties.  Most claimants consent; objectors are rare; sidelined 
lawyers are seldom in a position to complain in the interests of their 
clients, even if they were so inclined.  In short, both client consent and 
the objectivity of advice given by lawyers for claimants are seriously 
compromised.  Lingering uneasiness over this matter of client choice 
underlies the provision in the Principles allowing limited challenge by 
those who sign on.182 
In MDL settlement cases, there are two final concerns.  One is that a 
judgment on an MDL settlement raises jurisdictional concerns.  Forcing 
unhappy claimants to go to the transferee forum to challenge such a 
settlement poses a significant hardship and operates as a major hurdle.  It 
is true that the Court in the Shutts case approved the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over absent claimants in a class suit, even though they lacked 
                                                          
 181.   See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) (rejecting extension of preclusion 
based on “virtual representation” based on “identity of interests” in part because it would be “shorn 
of the procedural protections prescribed in Hansberry”); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
846 (1999) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)) (rejecting asbestos mass settlement 
for failing to satisfy FED. R. CIV. P. 23 and citing Hansberry as resting on a “principle of general 
application” entitling everyone to a day in court); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
805 (1985) (adjudicating court “may not be able to predetermine the res judicata effect of its own 
judgment”). 
 182.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18.  Illustration 2 says a claimant 
who signed an invalid waiver of right to informed consent—failing to warn that claimants “will be 
bound by any proposed settlement that a substantial majority of claimants approves”—may 
challenge for “procedural” unfairness.  See id. at § 3.18, 318 illus. 2. 
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connection to the forum.183  The theory was that they had no obligation to 
approach or participate in proceedings, and class counsel represents all 
members.184  This loose attitude is less appropriate in MDL cases in 
which claimants have their own lawyers and have suits on file elsewhere, 
and in which the transferee forum admittedly cannot try the cases.  The 
Principles, which severely restrict collateral review in any event, also 
purport to limit to the transferee forum any challenge adequacy of 
representation, in effect obligating them to do what Shutts assumed that 
they would not have to do.185 
Lastly, the transferee forum in an MDL case lacks authority to try the 
cases that it is managing. When PMC and defense counsel agree to a 
settlement, the atmosphere is one in which there is no threat of trial.  
Absent at least the possibility of a trial, there is no assurance that the 
settlement reflects “what the case is really worth.”  In Amchem, which 
condemned the purported global settlement of asbestos claims, one of the 
main concerns of the Court was that a case certified solely for purposes 
of settlement leaves counsel for the class “disarmed.”186  For different 
reasons, a similar difficulty bedevils MDL settlements. 
4. Policy Arguments Against Collateral Challenge 
The argument against collateral challenge is easily stated, and it rests 
on two overarching points.  First, judgments in MDL settlement cases 
serve a valuable purpose in our modern era, so they must be enabled, 
which in turn means that they must be final and resistant to collateral 
challenge.187  The hope is to encourage and legitimize this procedure, to 
make it into a more powerful engine for resolving disputes, which entails 
the capability of delivering on the promise of enforceable global 
resolutions of disputes, getting money to claimants and getting 
                                                          
 183.   Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811–12. 
 184.   Id. at 808–10 (stating claimants in class suits are in “different posture” from defendants 
and “are not subject to other burdens,” having no obligation to “hire counsel or appear” and ruling 
that the absent claimant “is not required to do anything”).  
 185.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18(b) (stating a claimant who 
“contests the amount” of settlement may bring challenge in court where case “is or was pending”).   
 186.   Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).  See generally Howard M. 
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 987–88 (2014) 
(concluding Amchem was actually “not cautious enough” in its approach to class action settlements 
by allowing the possibility of settlement classes “without plenary class certification,” thus enabling 
negotiation “with deleveraged would-be class counsel”) (emphasis added). 
 187.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.14 cmt. a (allowing collateral 
challenge to class judgments based on settlements, where these were or could have been raised 
during the litigation, undermines “integrity of the settlement process”). 
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defendants off the hook while saving judicial resources.  These laudable 
aims are essentially an appeal to necessity and a surrender to the 
pressures of mass wrongs and limited resources.  Second, the Principles 
rest on the view that there is no modern need for collateral challenge.  In 
the setting of class suits, modern procedure under Rule 23 ensures 
adequate consideration of matters like adequate representation in the 
initial suit.  At the time of Hansberry, class procedure was far less 
developed, and one could not depend on the court in a class action to 
exercise the kind of supervision, and entertain the kinds of challenges, 
that might in the end assure adequate representation of the interests of 
class members.188  In the setting of MDL settlements, all that is necessary 
is general supervision by the judge and a limited chance for claimants to 
be heard in the original proceedings. 
5. Scope of Collateral Review (What Should It Look Like?) 
In the most promising view of it, the central question to be addressed 
in a collateral challenge is whether the MDL settlement adequately 
compensated the claimant now pressing forward.  The next question is 
harder: Should “adequately compensated” be understood as referring to 
the situation of one who voluntarily accepts group representation, or 
should it be understood as referring to the situation of a claimant 
individually represented by her lawyer? 
In the setting of class suits brought under Rule 23(b)(3), it is at least 
plausible to say that claimants who don’t opt out have chosen to be part 
of the group and must accept the consequence of group representation, in 
which the lawyer represents the class and not each individual.189  This 
perspective then justifies approaching the question of adequate 
settlement by examining not the prospect for individual recovery by class 
members if they brought their own suit, but rather the prospect of success 
for the group as a whole. 
In appraising settlements in class suits then, courts have considered 
                                                          
 188.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 163, at 265 (Illinois law required “no further action beyond 
pleading a claim as a class action,” and there was no certification procedure; whether it was a class 
action was not decided until someone later argued that an opponent was bound as member of an 
earlier class). 
 189.   It is plausible also to reach the utterly different conclusion that even suits brought under 
Rule 23(b)(3) improperly distort individual claims to the point that they are unrecognizable as such.  
See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of 
Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (2003) (“[W]hat purports to be a 
class action, brought primarily to enforce private individuals’ substantive rights to compensatory 
relief, in reality amounts to little more than private attorneys acting as bounty hunters, protecting the 
public interest by enforcing the public policies embodied in controlling statutes.”). 
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the complexity, expense and likely duration of going to trial, the 
reactions of claimants to the proposed deal, the risks to claimants of 
losing on the issues of liability or damages if the case is tried, the stage 
of proceedings at which the proposed settlement has been put together, 
the ability of defendants to pay, and the size of the settlement in relation 
to estimates of likelihood and size of possible recovery (sometimes 
called the Grinnell or Girsh factors in recognition of prominent decisions 
that produced such lists).190  Courts have also examined the performance 
and resources of class counsel, the manner and extent of discovery, and 
the conduct of the negotiations, evaluating settlements for “substantive 
fairness,” and examining the “negotiating process.”191  What counts, 
then, is “justice for the class” rather than “justice for each claimant.”  
Even the strikingly original approach suggested by Professor David 
Dana, which approaches adequacy of class settlements by asking a 
“Rawlsian” question (What would a class member accept “before 
knowing her position in the class[?]”), accepts the proposition that a 
reasonable class settlement does not have to track what would be 
reasonable if the claimant were suing alone.192 
In the setting of individual suits gathered in the MDL process, the 
question should be different.  There is nothing in the gathering process 
that claimants agree to—their individual suits get transferred without 
their consent; they don’t consent to representation by the PMC (tacitly, 
by not “opting out”); the lawyers they chose to represent are sidelined 
from what is now the aggregate suit.  It is true that they can agree or not 
agree to the proposed settlement, and it is true that something similar can 
happen in class suits.  In both situations, the first opportunity of a 
claimant to participate or decline may come when lawyers have put 
together an agreement and invite participation or not (in class suits, 
joining the class and settling the case collapse into a single choice).  But 
claimants in gathered MDL suits made and acted on a different choice—
hiring a lawyer and coming forward individually with their claims.  And 
they may already have been pressed to accede to any settlement 
approved by a supermajority (a choice necessarily made in complete 
ignorance, as described above).  The pressures and informational deficits 
                                                          
 190.   Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell 
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 
43 (2d Cir. 2000)); Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 463.  See also In re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practices 
Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 322–29 (3d Cir. 1998) (extending consideration and approval of 
settlement of $1–$2 billion in nationwide class suit).   
 191.   E.g., Charron v. Wiener, 731 F.3d 241, 247–51 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 192.   David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral 
Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 280–83 (2006).   
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that call into question the fairness of a settlement, and the absence of any 
formally-recognized opportunity to be heard, put claimants in MDL 
cases in even worse position than their class action counterparts. 
For these reasons, the question to be asked when an MDL claimant 
challenges the adequacy of settlement is whether it would be a fair 
settlement if that claimant had been allowed to pursue her claim in the 
forum of original filing.  That is not to say that factors affecting fairness 
in class suits are irrelevant in appraising MDL settlements.  Of course the 
factors noted in Amchem and Ortiz count in MDL cases too.  Both those 
decisions stress “structural” problems, which are certainly relevant in 
MDL cases too.  In Amchem, structural problems included using one 
class to embrace persons suffering “a range of complaints” and in 
particular the use of one class that included “currently injured and 
exposure-only” people.193  In Ortiz, the Court said that when such 
differences appear, there should be subclasses involving representation 
by different lawyers, and in MDL cases a similar conclusion would 
require courts, at the very least, to insure membership on the PMC of 
lawyers representing such different interests.194  Both Amchem and Ortiz 
exemplify another kind of structural conflict, which came from linking 
class settlements with settlements of “inventory” claims, meaning that 
lawyers took advantage of some of leverage gained from filing class 
claims to gain better treatment for inventory claimants.195  Similarly in 
the setting of a challenge to an MDL settlement, the court should take up 
the question whether the MDL settlement included side deals between 
MDL lawyers and lawyers for the defense. 
Commentators on collateral challenge to class settlements sometimes 
treat the matter as though it involves a kind of judicial review of the 
original proceedings, in which deference is due to the findings of the 
original judge.  This view is at least defensible where judges must apply 
the requirements of Rule 23, and where the final settlement entails notice 
and a formal mechanism for objections.196  This view makes less sense 
                                                          
 193.   Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 595, 626–27 (1997) (concluding 
settlement lacked “structural assurance of fair and adequate representation”). 
 194.   Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856–59 (1999). 
 195.   Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1649, 1696 (2008) [hereinafter Issacharoff & Nagareda, Settlements Under Attack].  The 
inventory and class settlements are classic examples of “interdependent” settlements.  See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.16 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (interdependent 
settlements). 
 196.   See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from 
Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 865–66 (2007) (favoring “presumption” that non-objecting class 
member was adequately represented; the later court should consider only record before the original 
court and act only if original court “made a mistake,” not just because later court would do things 
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with collateral challenge to MDL settlements, which entail no similar 
requirements or proceedings.  Far preferable in the MDL setting is the 
proposition that the new court should consider the settlement de novo, as 
some courts have concluded even in class action cases.197 
The Principles mostly accept the descriptions of structural issues set 
out in Ortiz and Amchem, but leave out claimants in different disease 
categories, and use the term “structural” as a limit on even direct review 
of aggregate settlements.198  Ortiz and Amchem, however, used the term 
in exemplary rather than exhaustive fashion—neither decision implies 
that structural issues are the only ones that merit attention.  Equally 
striking, the Principles take the position that an aggregate settlement 
should not be subject to question on account of differences “created by 
the terms of a class settlement agreement” because such differences are 
not structural.199  Two Reporters on the Principles (Samuel Issacharoff 
and the late Richard Nagareda) attack Stephenson as exemplifying 
improper collateral review of facts arising after settlement.  (The 
settlement under review there made provision for service members 
exposed to Agent Orange who were to become symptomatic during the 
ten-year period following the agreement, but not for service members 
who became symptomatic thereafter.)  The authors suggest that the 
settlement was like an insurance policy given to all exposed veterans, 
which expired after ten years, and this ten-year cutoff was reasonable, so 
consideration by the reviewing court of post-litigation events in assessing 
the settlement’s adequacy of representation was “gravely mistaken.”200  
                                                          
differently). 
 197.   See Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 573 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 
1978) (in collateral challenge to class settlement, court resolves question of adequate representation 
“by determining whether the interests of those who would attack the judgment were vigorously 
pursued and protected”); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74–75 (5th Cir. 1973) (both initially and 
on collateral challenge, court “must stringently apply the requirement of adequate representation”); 
Hege v. Aegon USA, LLC, 780 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426–28 (D.S.C. 2011) (citing Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. 
v. Shell Oil Co., 591 S.E.2d 611, 618 (S.C. 2004)) (asking whether collateral court is “constrained to 
a limited review” of “adequate procedures,” or may engage in “broader, merits-based due process 
review,” and opting for the latter) (earlier class judgment not binding on plaintiff here); Fraternal 
Order of Police, Sheriff’s Lodge No. 32 v. Brescher, 579 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Keene v. 
United States, 81 F.R.D. 653 (S.D. W. Va. 1979) (de novo review on collateral challenge).  See also 
Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 436 (2000) (adequate representation is viewed de novo on collateral challenge) 
(citing some of these cases). 
 198.   See Issacharoff & Nagareda, Settlements Under Attack, supra note 195, at 1678–79, 91–98 
(citing asymptomatic versus ailing persons as raising structural issues, and interdependent 
settlements of inventory claims). 
 199.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 200.   Issacharoff & Nagareda, Settlements Under Attack, supra note 195, at 1687–88 (difference 
within Agent Orange class did not exist at time of settlement, hence “could not possibly skew the 
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In the Reporter’s Notes, the Principles make the same point: The 
approach of the Second Circuit in Stephenson turned on “a distinction 
that did not exist at the time of class certification but, rather, was the 
creation of the class settlement itself.”201 
It is not at all clear, however, that the Principles draw an intelligible 
line, or that the Agent Orange settlement is aptly likened to an insurance 
policy with reasonable exclusions.  The service people who became ill 
after 1994 had been exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam just as those 
who became symptomatic after settlement but prior to 1994; the 
judgment purported to bind them; the lawyers purported to represent 
their interests.202  Whether it was or was not reasonable to take the 
position that causation is too attenuated for those who became ill more 
than ten years after the settlement is one thing, but to bar inquiry into the 
matter in a later assessment of fairness is quite another. 
IV.   PERSPECTIVES AND DOUBTS 
Opening up MDL product liability settlements to collateral 
challenge, as this article suggests, may drive down the price defendants 
are willing to pay for peace and may even lessen the possibility of global 
settlements.  If establishing a checking mechanism is a good idea at all, 
the justification must be that this price is worth paying because such 
settlements are deeply problematic. 
It is hard to gauge this price and this benefit because we have 
nothing against which to compare the settlements achieved in the Vioxx 
and the Diet Drugs cases.  The same dilemma confronted the Court in 
Amchem, where Justice Breyer began his dissent from the ruling that 
threw out the settlement by asserting that the majority underestimated 
“the need for settlement.”203  He went on to stress that thousands of 
asbestos claims remained pending, that transaction costs of individual 
litigation were eating up sixty-one cents of every dollar of recovery, and 
that ongoing litigation was delaying and perhaps denying recovery for 
                                                          
design of any settlement”).   
 201.   See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07 cmt. d (adding that 
“Stephenson has not garnered much following in subsequent case law”). 
 202.   See Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class 
Suits for Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917, 936 (2010) (criticizing insurance analogy; “it 
was clear at the time of settlement that some veterans would receive no compensation simply 
because they would suffer injury after 1994”). 
 203.   Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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people exposed to asbestos four decades earlier.204  Against these 
benefits it may seems to be a sterile and technical argument to stress 
procedural standards.  Maybe it’s time to stop catering to the “lone wolf” 
mentality that insists that personal injury claims should go forward on an 
individual basis, stop sympathizing with plaintiffs’ lawyers who “bridle 
at having to heed the judgment of others,” who just want to do things 
“their own way,” and to adopt the apparent view of the MDL Panel that 
“nineteenth-century attitudes must give way to twenty-first-century 
litigation realities.”205 
But we have no reason for confidence in the justice of those 
settlements either.  With no checks in place, with negotiations conducted 
by self-interested lawyers aided by courts who signal strongly that they 
want the cases settled, we have good reason to doubt that we are doing 
justice.206 
The asbestos cases may hold an additional lesson: One of the motive 
forces behind the move to aggregate is the conviction that mass tort suits 
simply cannot be handled on an individual basis—that “twenty-first-
century litigation realities” don’t permit it.  But after the failure of the 
Amchem settlement the MDL Panel transferred thousands of pending 
claims to Judge Eduardo Robreno of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, who managed to coordinate procedures leading to trials by 
consent before several judges and magistrates in that district, which in 
turn resolved almost two hundred thousand cases,207 on principles 
utilizing some threshold standards to weed out weak claims but 
otherwise “disaggregated” cases so that “each claim against each 
defendant” could “stand on its own merit[s].”208  In an echo of Professor 
Marcus’ comment, Judge Robreno said that trial judges are “by their 
nature and culture lone wolves who act alone in the execution of their 
duties,”209 and there is reason to conclude that his handling of the 
asbestos cases succeeded where aggregation failed. 
                                                          
 204.   Id. at 630–32 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 13 (Mar. 1991)).   
 205.   Marcus, Maximalist Use of MDL’s Transfer Power, supra note 20, at 2268–69.  
 206.   See Koniak, supra note 119, at 1797–99 (arguing for collateral review of class settlements 
of mass tort cases and defending her view that “the class action world is full of abuse” by describing 
the incentives and procedures leading to class settlements and suggesting that “one does not need a 
world-class economist to predict that those who are not at the bargaining table will get the short end 
of the stick”).   
 207.   See Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 180–85 (2013). 
 208.   Id. at 186–88.   
 209.   Id. at 188–89.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
MDL gathering in product liability cases is not going to end soon, 
and settlement is far and away the most likely outcome.  Perhaps such 
settlements can be fair and adequate, and a settlement that delivers 
compensation and ends litigation is good at least to that extent. 
Still, the conditions that produce such settlements do not inspire 
confidence.  The transferee court that handles every such case lacks 
sanction or standard that is normally found in Rule or statute, and yet this 
court exercises considerable influence over the course of proceedings 
and is motivated to clear gathered cases from the docket in a single 
resolution.  The lawyers who run the suit for the claimants are 
handpicked by the transferee judge and put under pressure to settle.  
These lawyers cannot realistically threaten trial if negotiations lead to a 
lowball offer, and they are motivated to settle too, if only to recoup their 
investment in the litigation and make a profit.  The transferee court, 
unsure of its authority to review any proposed settlement, nevertheless 
reviews it while being motivated itself to approve a settlement in order to 
end what would otherwise be major and scattered litigation. Sidelined 
lawyers for many if not most of the claimants are not in good position to 
object or influence events, and are pushed toward going along with 
whatever is proposed by the lawyers who run the case with the judge’s 
approval.  And these lawyers are likely to prevail upon their clients to go 
along too. 
What is missing and needed is a mechanism to check the fairness and 
adequacy of MDL product liability settlements.  In the setting of class 
suits, there is precedent for collateral review on behalf of class members 
who are included in class settlements.  Such review should be available 
for MDL product liability settlements too.  A dissatisfied settling 
claimant should be able to bring suit and raise these questions.  A second 
court should be able to set aside an MDL settlement if it is unfair or 
inadequate, when compared to the relief that such client could reasonably 
anticipate in a suit of her own.  Only in such a setting can we have any 
confidence that fairness and adequacy have been adequately attended to. 
 
